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53 CONCENTRATION  ISSUES  IN  THE  U.S.  BEEF  SUBSECTOR 
A.  Objective  and  Framework 
The  principal  issue  to  be  addressed in this part is whether  the  changing 
concentration  of ownership  and decision making within the various  functional 
levels  of the beef subsector has  altered the  competitiveness  of any  of the 
levels  or  the  subsector  as  a  whole.  Each  of these  terms  needs  to be  defined. 
The  term concentration as  used here is broadly  synonymous  with  the  terms 
"business  organization"  or  "market structure,"  the latter being generally pre-
ferred by  economists.  By  market  structure we  mean  those  relatively unalter-
able  characteristics of markets  that can confer  on market participants  (buyers 
or sellers)  some  discretion over pricing or  output levels.'  It is conventional 
to  distinguish three  elements  or  dimensions  of  "imperfect"  market structure, 
namely,  market  concentration,  product differentiation,  and  the  conditions  of 
market  entry or exit.  Economic  theory and  empirical observation have  shown 
that each of  the  three  elements  of market  structure  can affect the pricing or 
output behavior  of buyers  or  sellers in a  market,  at least in the  short run. 
That  is,  imperfectly structured markets  can generate market  power  - - the  con-
trol over price or entry conditions . . 
Market  concentration in its narrow  sense  (to be  used hereafter)  is  the 
number  and size distribution of buyers  or sellers  in a  given market.  When  the 
numbers  are  large  and fairly equal  in size,  the  market  is said to be  "atomis-
tic."  When  the  numbers  are  small  or very unequal  in size,  the market  is 
termed  concentrated or oligopolistic.  A  market with only  one  seller is  a 
monopoly;  with  one  buyer,  it is  a  monopsony.  Exactly what  constitutes  a  con-
centrated market  is  a  measurement  issue that will be  discussed in Section V.D. 
below.  In general,  levels  of concentration tend  to  be  quite stable,  moving 
only  a  few  percentage points  during  a  period of five  or  ten years . -2-
Product differentiation refers  to  the  extent to  which  some  products 
offered by different sellers are  regarded as  distinctly and consistently 
superior  to  other products  in the  same  market  by buyers.  The  differences  of 
interest rest less  on  the physical quality differences  among  products  than on 
perceptions  of reputation,  reliability,  or less  tangible  images  often associ-
ated with brands,  trademarks,  and  imperfect buyer  information.  Physical  q~al­
ity differences  such as  color,  ingredient proportions,  or durability, are 
objectively measurable;  indeed,  grading  systems  exist precisely to  remove  most 
important within-grade quality differences.  Undifferentiated product markets 
are  called homogeneous. 
Barriers  to market  entry is  the  third dimension of market  structure. 
Entry is considered "free"  when potential entrants have  access  to  the  same  or 
lower-cost production techniques  as  established sellers,  when  the creation of 
new productive capacity at an optimal  scale is negligible  (or financing  the 
investment  is easily available at the  same  or  lower  interest rates  charged to 
established firms  in the market),  and when  entry can occur practically over-
night.  Free  entry also  requires  that the  incumbent  sellers in the  market will 
not  take  aggressive  actions  to prevent or  slow new  firms  from  entering the 
market;  that is,  the  incumbent  firms  must  ignore  or act passively in the  face 
of entry.  Finally,  entry is free  only if,  after entering,  a  new  seller finds 
that exit from  the market  is also costless  and  instantaneous;  that is  firms 
that desire  to  leave  a  market  find that their fixed  investments  are not  sunk 
costs  and  can be  fully salvaged.  If any  of these  conditions  are not met, 
entry is  said to  be blockaded (if fully effective)  or  forestalled (if simply 
slowed).  The  existence of barriers  to  entry permits  sellers  to  pursue  long-
run pricing and  output strategies;  without barriers,  firms  in highly concen-
trated industries  can  follow noncompetitive  strategies  only  in the  short run 
out  of fear  that they will attract so  many  new  competitors  as  to  make  noncom-
petitive strategies  infeasible. -3-
The  importance  of market  structure  is  in the' quality of the  resulting 
perfo~mance of  the market.  When  markets  are  atomistic,  products  are  homogene-
ous,  and entry free,  then it is known  that the  market  is  going  to perform 
well.  That  is,  perfectly structured markets  yield equilibrium prices  that 
respond  only  to  the  forces  of consumer  demand  and  industry costs  of production 
and distribution.  Prices  are just high  enough  to  reward sellers with normal 
profits  (adjusted for  the  riskiness  of  the business  and averaged over  a  number 
of years).  Technological progress  is  as  rapid as  innovation possibilities 
will  allow. 
However,  if one  or more  of the market-structure  dimensions  significantly 
departs  from  the  competitive  ideal  there  is  a  tendency  for monopolistic prac-
tices  to  develop  in the  industry.  If successful,  such practices will  lead to 
reduced output  and selling prices  above  the  expected competitive equilibrium 
price.  If directed on the buying side of an  industry's operations,  monopson-
is  tic practices will force  down  the prices paid to  input suppliers  to  below 
the  expected equilibrium price.  Either pricing strategy will result in widen-
ing  industry margins  and,  hence,  profit rates  above  normal  rates  of return 
(adjusted for  risk and  over  time).  Supranormal selling prices  (subnormal 
input prices)  become  a  device  for  transferring  income  from  product buyers  to 
? 
product sellers  (or  from  input suppliers  to  input buyers). 
It is in this  sense  that monopolistic pricing is  "unfair. "  Not  only  do 
prices become  distorted and  cause  some  buyers  to  switch their purchases  to 
inferior substitutes,  but also  those buyers  who  continue  to  purchase  the  pro-
duct at the  enhanced price end  up  paying  a  premium  to  the  owners  of the  monop-
oly.  Quantitative studies  of several monopolistic  industries  confirm  that 
the  latter amount  (the  income  transfer)  is many  times  larger than the  lost 
consumption and production  (the  so-called dead-weight  loss). 
Thus,  we  may  restate  the principal  issue  in more  precise  terms.  Is  the 
market  structure at any  functional  level of the beef subsector  so  imperfect -4-
that it has  conferred market  power  on 'some  group  of sellers  (or buyers)? 
Recall  that market  power  is  the ability (if not  the  actual wielding)  to  exer-
cise  some  discretion over buying or selling prices;  it is also  the  power  to 
exclude would-be  sellers  from  entering  a  market.  This  concept  is both  the 
economic  and legal definition of market  power. 
We  shortly turn to  an examination of the  facts  concerning  the  levels of 
market  concentration,  product differentiation,  and ease  of market  entry.  The 
next-to-last section summarizes  and  assesses  economic  studies of market  power 
relevant  to  the beef subsector.  Finally,  alternative policy scenarios  are 
addressed.  But first we  digress  on  the essential matter of proper market  and 
industry definitions. 
B.  Market Definitions 
A  market  consists  of  two  sides,  the  sellers  (the  industry)  and  the buyers 
(the  customers  or  demand  segments  served).  All sellers of the  same  product 
and all buyers  of the  same  product  are  in the  same  market.  The  problem at 
,,,,- hand is delineating what  "the  same"  means  in the  context of beef.  To  properly 
delineate  a  market's boundary,  one  must  examine both the  selling side  and buy-
ing side  simultaneously. 
Product  Scope 
We  reviewed existing studies  of  the  demand  for  red meats  and beef in par-
ticular  (Huang).  It was  found  that beef was  to  some  degree  substitutable for 
other high-protein foods.  Pork,  veal,  lamb,  and  chicken are moderately  sub-
stitutable for beef,  whereas  fish,  eggs ,  dairy products,  and  other high-
protein foods  are  poor substitutes.  Within the beef products  category,  fresh 
(frozen or refrigerated cuts)  beef is not substitutable for  processed  (salted 
or  smoked)  meats,  even  though  many  processed meats  are wholly or partially 
beef in content.  Similarly,  beef "varietal meats"  and,  of course,  nonedible -5-
beef by-products  are  considered very poor  substitutes for  fresh beef by 
consumers. 
While  the  findings  on  the  demand  side  are  sensible  and well  documented, 
there  is  more  judgment  required for  considering substitutability on the  supply 
side.  Moreover,  the  appropriate market definitions  appear  to vary  according 
to which  stage  of  the beef subsector we .are  considering. 
At  the producer  and feedlot  ~evel, beef-cattle raising is fairly well 
defined.  There  are  few  alternative animal  enterprises  for  cattlemen in the 
West  who  pasture their animals  (except perhaps  sheep  or buffalo).  Beef cattle 
enterprises  in the  Corn Belt have  more  alternatives,  including veal,  hog, 
dairy,  and poultry raising.  However,  these alternatives  today are  accompanied 
by  substant~al real asset fixity that militates against rapid changes  in pro-
duct mix  in response  to  product price changes.  Culled cows,  both spent dairy 
cows  and  from  cow-calf operations,  appear  to  be  distinct products  at the  pro-
ducer  level. 
At  the processor level,  the  Census  Bureau places meatpacking plants  (SIC 
2011)  in a  separate  industry  from  meat processing plants  (SIC  2014).  Both of 
these  industries have high specialization  (97  to  98%  in recent years)  and 
coverage  (61%  to  86%)  ratios.  For  example,  in 1982  meatpacking plants'  ship-
ments  consisted 98%  by value of meatpacking products  (the specialization 
ratio)  and  85%  of all meatpacking products  were  made  in meatpacking plants 
(coverage  ratio). 
However,  within the meatpacking  industry,  the  Census  Bureau  identifies 
ten classes of meatpacking products:  fresh beef,  veal,  lamb  and mutton,  pork, 
lard,  and  so  forth.  In the  1982  Census  of Manufactures,  only  30%  of the  1,780 
meatpacking plants  counted were  primarily shipping products  in only  one  of the 
ten product classes.  The  remainder  were  what  we  will call multi-species 
plants  are  quite  small.  In the  case  of beefpacking,  the  225  meatpacking 
plants  most  specialized in beef slaughter accounted for nearly all the beef -6-
shipped in 1982.  Thus,  specialized beefpacking plants  in the  aggregate  pro-
duce  only  a  negligible  amount  of pork,  and vice-versa. 
The  Packers  and Stockyards Administration  (P&SA)  of USDA  has  for  many 
years  distinguished between steer-heifer and  cow-bull beefpacking  pl~nts . 
(Veal,  pork,  and  lamb  slaughtering have  also been treated separately.)  Not 
only are  these plants  specia~ized as  to  equipment,  but  they are  als.o  geograph-
ically somewhat  specia~ized .  Cow-bull  slaughter  is  found  more  widely wherever 
a  state has  dairy operations;  large steer-heifer plants are  found  primarily in 
the  Western  Corn Belt  and High  Plains states.  On  the basis  of this  and  other 
evidence,  it appears  that for  the vast bulk of beefpacking,  there  is very 
little scope  for  supply substitution between cow-bull  and steer-heifer slaugh-
ter.  The  fact that nearly all culled .cow meat  is  sold for  further processing 
into  sausage products  and little beef from  younger  animals  (mostly  tougher 
muscle)  finds  its way  to  sausage plants  reinforces  this distinction. 
A  more  recent distinction,  made  in P  &  S  publications  since  the late 
1970s,  is the partitioning of steer-heifer slaughter into boxed beef and car-
cass beef.  The  proportion of all beef sold as  boxed beef rose  from  30%  in 
1972  to  82%  in 1988.  Some  industry analysts  expect carcass beef to practi-
cally disappear during  the  1990s.  The  question 'for  us  is whether boxed beef 
is  a  separate market  from  carcass beef.  Both  the  technology of production and 
demand  characteristics appear  to  support  the  affirmative.  Although it is pos-
sible to produce boxed beef in conventional carcass plants,  nearly all is  made 
in separate  "fabricating"  plants  that were built since  1960.  In  some  cases, 
fabricating plants  stand alone,  relying on carcasses  from  slaughtering plants 
within 100  miles  or  so,  while  in other cases  fabricating plants were built 
adjacent  to  large steer-heifer slaughtering plants  that provide  a  large  share 
of  the  carcasses  needed for  further processing.  In either case,  the  type  of 
equipment used and  labor  requirements  imply  that conversion of fabricating 
plants  into slaughtering facilities  is unlikely to be  economically feasible . -7-
Asset fixity at the distribution stage  of the beef subsector further rein-
forces  the distinctiveness of boxed beef  from  carcass beef.  The  conversion of 
grocery stores'  meatcutting facilities  to boxed beef meant  that the  number  and 
skills of butchers  was  substantially reduced;  in-store carcass handling  equip-
ment  was  discarded;  and  space needed for  carcass  cutting was  converted to 
other uses.  Once  wedded  to boxed beef,  retailers would  find  the  change  nearly 
irreversible.  Thus,  arguments  on both the  demand  side  and  the  supply side 
support treating boxed and  carcass beef as  separ~te industries. 
At  the  distribution level of the beef subsector,  there  appear  to be  at 
least four  distinct marketing channels:  retail food  stores,  commercial  and 
institutional food-service,  government  procurement,  and  exports.  Methods  of 
contracting or bargaining differ considerably  among  the  four  channels.  In 
this  report,  we  focus  mainly  on  the  food  store channel,  which  accounts  for 
about  80%  of the manufacturer's value  of U.S.  beef. 
Geographic  Scope 
In addition to  product characteristics,  proper market delineation must 
consider  the  geographic  scope  of a  market  as  well.  This  is  a  critical consid-
eration because  several data series are  available  only for  the United States, 
whereas  at some  stages beef markets  are  subnationa1. 
Feeder cattle are  sold primarily at local markets  located no  more  than 
200  miles  from  the  ranches  on which  they were  raised.  Fed cattle are  sold 
primarily to  order buyers  from  nearby meatpacking plants.  The  order buyers 
purchase  80%  of their live animals  on  average  150  miles  from  the plains  states 
meatpacking plants  they represent  (and only  135  miles  from  Midwestern plants). 
Therefore,  the  geographic boundaries  for  live animal  sales  typically extend no 
more  than  200  miles  from  the point of production or processing,  with  the  exact 
location and  shape  influenced by  major  transportation routes ,  transportation -8-
barriers  such as 'mountain ranges,  political boundaries,  and  centers  of  com-
merce  and price  information  (e .g.,  Omaha,  Denver,  etc.). 
Boxed beef and carcass beef is sold essentially on  a  national basis  to 
food  stores  and meat wholesalers,  though  the  Rocky Mountains  create  a  semi-
permeable barrier to  east-west trading of fresh  and  frozen beef.  The 
boundaries  of the beef export market  are supranational. 
International Trade  and  Investment 
To  this point,  the  U.S.  beef industry has  been discussed as  though it 
were  isolated from  the rest of the world.  However,  both international trade 
and  international direct  investment  can alter the  geographic boundaries  of 
markets. 
Imports  of fresh  and  frozen beef have  accounted for  from  5%  to  9%  of the 
U.S.  supply of beef since  the  early 1970s  (Connor  1988:Appendix Table  A-14) . 
There  is no  upward trend in imports.  These  imports  often consist of canned or 
frozen grass-fed beef that may  not  compete  directly with the  fresh grain-fed 
beef used in boxed beef.  As  mentioned in Chapter  IV  of this report,  beef 
imports  are effectively limited by voluntary export agreements,  tariffs,  and 
sometimes  quotas.  So  long  as  U.S.  protectionism continues,  domestic  competi-
tion is hardly affected by  import  competition.  The  beefpacking concentration 
data discussed below are overstated by at most  5%  'because  of beef imports. 
Exports  can also affect the proper measurement  of domestic  concentration. 
If the  leading firms  export  a  greater share  of their domestic  production than 
do  nonleading  firms,  national concentration data are  overstated.  Both  smaller 
and larger packers  are  engaged in exports .  Evidence  from  a  USDA  survey of 
U.S .  food  processors  is that smaller  firms  are  more  export oriented  (Handy  and 
MacDonald  1989).  Moreover,  much  of the  exports  of beef from  the U.S.  consists 
of variety meats  and pet food  ingredients,  products  that do  not  compete  with 
grain-fed boxed beef.  The  amount  of beef exported from  the U.S.  is large -9-
($1,205  million in 1988),  but at most  3%  of the value  of beef shipped  from 
u.s.  plants has  been exported in the  1980so (Connor  1988:Appendix Table  A-15; 
USDA  1989).  The  export ratio has  risen from  about  1%  in 1970-1972.  There-
fore,  the  likely impact  of exports  on  domestic  competition and concentration 
may  be  dismissed as  negligible  so  long as  protectionist policies of importing 
countries  remain  in place. 
A major  development  since World War  II has  been  the  accelerating foreign 
direct  investment  involving the  U.S.  economy.  Quantitatively,  foreign  invest-
ment  has  become  a  greater source  of economic  internationalization than  trade. 
Foreign investment has  the potential for altering the  strategic conduct  of 
firms  and,  hence,  the  competitive performance  of industries. 
Let  us  first examine  foreign  investment by U.S.-owned  firms  abroad  so-
called outward  investment.  This  kind of foreign  involvement began over  a 
hundred years  ago.  Probably  the first food  company  to  invest abroad was  a 
condensed milk enterprise  in the  l870s  called AnglO-Swiss  Milk Co.,  ironically 
one  of the predecessor  companies  of the world's  largest food processing com-
, 
pany,  Nestle,  S.A.  The  first large-scale food processing  investments  abroad 
were  by  the  leading U.S.  meatpackers.  Beginning  in 1907,  the big meatpackers 
made  substantial  investments  in Argentina,  Brazil,  Uruguay,  Paraguay, 
Australia,  and  New  Zealand  (Horst 1974),  mainly  to  serve  the  U.K.  export 
trade.  By  °1915  Swift had  15%  of its assets  abroad. 
By  1986  (the latest,  preliminary data available)  U.S.  companies  owned 
17,000  foreign affiliates  (subsidiaries  or joint ventures)  which  employed  over 
6  million people .  About  40%  of all such assets  abroad  involve manufacturing 
operations,  of which  about  8%  is  in food manufacturing.  U.S.  multinationals 
had only  24  meat  processing affiliates abroad in 1986,  with total assets  of 
$1.2 billion and sales  of $2.5 billion.  U.S.  meatpacking  and meat processing 
firms  derive  less  than  4%  of their total sales  from plants  located abroad,  a 
far  smaller proportion than the rest of food manufacturing  (15%).  Therefore, -10-
on  the basis of both export sales  (3%)  and other overseas  sales  (4%),  the 
degree  of internationalization for u.s.  meat  companies  is relatively small  and 
has  likely declined since the earlier part of this  century. 
Of  somewhat  more  popular concern is  the rapid rate at which u.s.  assets 
have  been purchased by  foreign  investors.  Several  spectacularly large  take-
overs  of large U. S.  food  manufac.turing companies  have  occurred during  the  last 
, 
decade  (Carnation by Nestle,  Pillsbury by  Grand Metropolitan,  and others). 
Accomplished almost entirely by merger,  foreign entry has  pushed up  the value 
of their investments  in U. S.  food  proces'sing by  790%  during  the  ten years  from 
1977  to  1987.  In 1986  there were  142  foreign-owned  food processing affiliates 
with  $21  billion in total assets,  $22  billion in sales,  and 162,000  employees. 
Most  of  the affiliates were  engaged in the manufacture  of highly processed 
consumer  packaged  foods  and beverages.  Meat  processing affiliates were  a 
small portion of the  total,  only  10  in number,  with  $0.6 billion in assets, 
$1 .2  billion in sales,  and 4,500  employees.  Unlike  other areas  of  food  manu-
facturing,  foreign-owned meat  processors  are  contracting;  for  example,  employ-
ment  since  1980 has  shrunk by  85%. 
Another point of contrast is profitability of foreign operations.  The 
"profits"  of foreign subsidiaries  is properly termed direct investment  income; 
it is  the distributed and reinvested earnings  (net return on  equity invest-
ment) ,  plus  interest paid on  long-term debt  owed  to  the  foreign parents,  less 
local withholding  taxes  on earnings  or interest.  U.S.  investments  in food 
processing abroad  tended  to be  more  profitable than domestic  operations;  in 
1986,  for  example,  profits were  5.3%  of sales.  Meat  processing affiliates 
abroad had  lower profitability  (2.5%),  but still above  domestic  levels.  The 
u.s.  food  processing affiliates of foreign multinationals,  on  the other hand, 
were  much  less profitable,  averaging  1.8%  on sales  in 1986  and meat affiliates 
even  lower  than that. -11-
Most  U.S.  investment  abroad is located in Europe  (46%  of 1986  assets) , 
Latin America  (17%),  and  Canada  (14%).  Japan is  a  distant fourth place with 
9%,  but that share  is rising rapidly  (from  only  6%  in 1982).  Food processing 
outward  investments  follow  a  similar pattern,  except that U.S . -owned Japanese 
affiliates accounted for  only  6%  of food processing  investment  in 1982  and 
1986. 
Most  inward  investment originates  from  Europe,  Canada,  and Japan.  In the 
U.s.  food processing industries,  almost all foreign  investment was  from  Europe 
(60%  of total assets  in the  1980s)  and  Canada  (33%).  The  dollar value  of 
Japanese  ownership  in U.S .  food processing rose  slightly in the  1980s,  but its 
share of the  total fell  from  4%  in 1980  to  2%  in 1986.  Ownership  of U.S.  meat 
processors by Japanese  investors  is similarly modest,  about  5  to  6%  of all 
foreign  investment' in U.S .  meat  companies  (compared  to  over  80%  by  European 
investors),  amounting  to  about  $25  million in total assets  today  (less  than  1% 
of  the  industry total).  In the  case  of foreign-owned  agricultural  land  (farm 
and  forest),  Europeans  own  38%,  Canadians  28%,  and Japanese  3% . 
The  economic  power  of Japan and its interest in the U.S.  as  a  source  of 
food will doubtless  lead to  substantial  increases  in investments  in U.S.  com-
panies .  Preliminary 1987  data  show  that Japanese-owned nonbank assets  in the 
U.S.  increased to  $196  billion,  a  one-year  increase of  99.6% ,  making Japan the 
largest single country of foreign ownership .  However,  Japanese direct  invest-
ments  in the U.S .  is  so  far  only what would be  expected given its share of 
non-U.S.  world  GNP.  The  $98  billion in Japanese-owned nonbank U.S.  assets  in 
1986  were  located primarily in wholesale  trade  ($39  billion),  finance  ($36 
billion),  manufacturing  ($11 billion),  and real estate  ($6  billion).  Food  and 
agricultural  investments  account  for  less  than  5%  of total Japanese  invest-
ment,  and most  of it is  raw  farm product wholesaling.  Japanese  investment  in 
agriculture  (including feedlots)  amounted  to  only  $82  million in 1986.  Out  of 
the  15  million acres  of all types  of U.S.  land  owned  by  foreigners  (0.7% of -12-
total u.s.  land area),  Japanese  investors  reported owning  only 116,000 acres, 
though  recent purchases  reported in the  trade press will likely increase that 
amount.  At  the  end of 1988,  USDA  reported that foreign companies  and persons 
owned  5.1 million acres  of u .s.  farmland  and forest;  of that,  Japanese 
*  investors  owned  146,600  acres  (3%). 
There  is little evidence  that foreign  investors  follow maverick business 
strategies.  Except  for  a  tendency  toward  low profitability,  foreign  investors 
generally play by  the  local rules,  blend in with their domestic  competitors, 
and  do  little to  shake  the boat.  Japanese  investors  would  appear  to be 
imitating this pattern.  Their primary interest in the u.s.  is in ensuring  a 
supply  of grains,  oilseeds,  and meat  for  the Japanese market.  Their  foreign 
investment has  been primarily in agricultural products wholesaling  ($3  billion 
in U.S.  assets  generating  $8  billion in U.S.  exports)  rather  than food 
processing. 
Excess  Capacity 
Another  consideration in proper market delineation is the  issue of excess 
capacity.  If reasonably efficient plants  are  temporarily closed and can be 
restarted quickly,  their capacity must be  considered part of the potential 
sales  size of the market.  Similarly,  if plants  are  running with single shifts 
and  labor market  conditions permit  adding  a  second shift fairly readily,  then 
that too  is regarded as  part of the  excess  capacity of the  industry.  In other 
words,  market  size consists of actual sales plus  excess  capacity. 
Excess  capacity can affect  the proper measurement  of concentration.  For 
example,  if the  top  four  producers  control  60%  of sales  in an  industry and 
* In 1988,  u.S .  companies  that were  10%  or more  owned  by  foreign residents 
owned  an additional  7.4 million acres  of agricultural  land.  The  total of 
12.5 million acres  that is  foreign-owned  represents  about  0.7%  of u.S. 
agricultural  land;  Japanese  ownership  totaled 218,000  acres. -13-
there  is  25%  idle capacity among  the  firms  below  the  top  four,  then actual 
concentration is  50%.  If,  on  the other hand,  idle capacity is spread propor-
tionately between leading and nonleading  firms ;  then concentration ratios 
based' on sales  are not affected by  excess  capacity.  As  far  as  is known,  the 
latter is  the  case  in beefpacking. 
Vertical  Subsector Organization 
One  final  consideration in proper market  delineation is vertical sub-
sector organization.  To  what  extent are  the  functional  stages  of the beef 
subsector  connected by market  or nonmarket  linkages.  The  two  primary non-
market  coordinating mechanisms  to be  discussed are vertical integration  (the 
common  ownership  of  two  distinct stages)  and contract integration  (production 
or marketing  agreements  between nominally  independent  firms  located at 
adjacent stages  of  the  subsector). 
There  are at least five major  functional  stages  of  the  fed beef subsec-
tor:  cow-calf operations,  grower-stocker operations,  feedlots ,  meatpackers 
and fabricators,  and meat  distributors.  (The  branch of the beef subsector 
utilizing spent dairy cattle is quite different and will be  ignored here). 
Data quoted here  are primarily from  the early 1980s  (Marion,  et al.  1986). 
Cow-calf producers  are  small  (average  150 head)  and widely dispersed on 
ranches  around  the  country.  Calves  are presently raised to  500  to  600  lb .  and 
sold seasonally at  6  to  9  months  of age.  Almost  90%  of the  calves  are  placed 
in growing  operations  or directly to  feedlots. 
Growing-stocking  operators  raise calves  on  roughage  until  they reach  700 
to  800  lb.  This  is  the  least distinct stage  of the beef subsector because  40-
50% of feeder  cattle come  from  integrated cow-calf operations .  Thus ,  approx -
imately  50-60%  of feeder  cattle were  purchased in auction markets  by  growers . 
Moreover,  about  20-30%  of all feeder cattle  come  from  growing  operations  that 
are vertically integrated with feedlots,  the  rest being sold through  order -14-
buyers  or auction markets..  Thus,  only about  15-25%  of all feeder  cattle 
reaching  feedlots  have  been sold twice  in markets,  once  as  calves  and  second 
as  steers or heifers. 
Feedlots  raise feeder  cattle to  1,050  to  1,250  lb.  using enriched grain 
feeds.  Unlike  growers,  feedlot sales  and  geographic  location are  more  concen-
trated.  Feedlots with daily capacity of 1,000  or more  marketed  68%  of all fed 
cattle in 1982,  up  from  35%  in 1962.  The  largest  (8,000  head or  more)  300-400 
feedlots  are  commercial  feedlots  (as  opposed  to  farm  feedlots)  and account  for 
over  50%  of U. S .  fed cattle.  Approximately  20-30%  of fed cattle are  from 
feedlot-owned  growing  operations,  and  5-9%  from  feedlot-owned  cow-calf opera-
tions.  About  4%  of fed cattle move  from  feedlots  owned by packers  in the 
early 1980s,  down  from  7%  in mid-1960s.  Some  of the  largest feedlots  are 
owned by major  feed  grain companies  (Cargill,  Continental). 
Cattle feeding  is also  geographically concentrated.  The  top  8  states 
were  Nebraska  (18%),  Texas  (17%),  Kansas  (13%),  Iowa  (12%),  Colorado  (8%), 
California  (5%),  Illinois  (4%),  and  Oklahoma  (3%).  Shift to  Plains  states 
encouraged by  new  milo varieties,  irrigated grain supplies,  and packer  loca-
tions.  In 1982  beef shipments  for  8  states were  Nebraska  (21%),  Texas  (16%), 
Kansas  (14%),  Iowa  (10%),  Colorado  (6%) ,  California  (3%),  Illinois  (3%),  and 
Oklahoma  (1%). 
Feedlots  sell  90%  of their cattle direct to packers,  5%  through  auction 
markets,  2%  in terminal  cash markets,  and  4%  internal  transactions  (vertical 
integration).  Markets  are  used for  smaller and mixed lots of cattle.  In 1965 
the proportions  were  42%  direct,  31%  terminal,  19%  auction,  and  8%  internal. 
In the  mid  1980s  about  one-third of fed cattle were  sold on  a  "hot weight" 
basis  (which  requires  substantial trust between feedlots  and packers),  up  from 
11%  in 1965.  Contractual  integration between feedlots  and packers,  which  is  a 
special  type  of  "direct"  sale,  has  accounted for  10%  to  25%  of sales  of fed 
cattle since  1960.  According  to  USDA  estimates ,  10%  of fed cattle were  sold -15-
under  packer  contracts  in 1960,  18%  in ·1970,  and  10%  in 1980.  Recently  signed 
contracts  may  have  raised contractual  and vertical integration into  the  20-25% 
range  (Rose  1989) .  Contractual  integration by beef packers  is far below  the 
levels  found  in broilers  and  turkeys  (89%  and  62%  in 1980) . 
Beefpackers  and processors  purchase practically all fed cattle.  Prices 
are  determined administratively for  the  4%  of the cattle that  come  from 
packer-owned feedlots .  Cattle sold under  contract use various  formulas  based 
on  grade,  yield,  cash prices,  future prices,  and  adjustments. 
The  majority of fed cattle are priced by private negotiations  on  each  lot 
between feedlot  operators  and field-level packer  representatives.  Field-level 
buyers  may  be  salaried employees  of packers,  agents,  or brokers.  In the  late 
1970s,  salaried buyers  accounted for  about  90%  of cattle purchases .  Fie1d-
level buyers  are  in frequent  daily contact with  the beefpackers'  head buyer. 
the head buyer  manages  five  to  ten salaried buyers  per plant and  is  responsi-
ble for  developing  a  daily pricing strategy and specific buy  orders .  The  head 
buyer  arrives at  a  daily offer price after assessing many  pieces  of  informa-
tion from  sources within and without  the  firm.  From  carcass  salesmen the 
buyer  learns  about  future  delivery obligations  to retailers,  planned. retail 
specials,  and wholesaler  inventories;  salaried field buyers  provide  informa-
tion on feedlot  conditions  and prices paid by  competing packers;  other divi-
sions tell buyers  slaughtering costs ,  delivery costs,  product  shrinkage, 
planned plant operating levels,  and by-product prices ;  from  external  sources 
head buyers  get  information on  average  carcass prices  (by  grade  and  type), 
cash prices  for cattle traded,  prices  for  other meat products ,  cattle futures 
prices,  and weather conditions.  The  details  of how  such  information is used 
to  arrive at  a  daily price policy is well  described by  Ward  (1988:58-79) . 
Although backward vertical integration to  feedlots  is substantial,  there 
is  no  important  forward vertical or contractual  integration by packers .  Car-
cass beef is sold primarily in direct trading between packers  and -16-
distributors;  over  two-thirds  of these  trades  are priced from  formula  agree-
ments,  the  remainder  by private negotiations  or offer-acceptance arrangements. 
In contrast,  boxed beef direct trading is mostly by negotiated pricing,  par-
ticularly when retailers are  the buyers.  Boxed beef or fabricated beef pro-
ducts  are sold to  foodservice  customers  mainly under  cost-plus  formula-pricing 
arrangements. 
Retailers  purchase  75-80%  of all the beef from packers,  of which  about 
half is sold directly to  integrated grocery wholesaler-retailers  and half to 
specialized meat wholesalers.  Another  15%  to  20%  'is sold to  co~ercial and 
institutional foodservice  operators.  An  important  and  growing  segment  of  the 
foodservice  channel  are  fast-food chains;  these  operations  are major  customers 
for  lean ground beef made  from  tougher  carcasses  and  trimmings.  There  is evi-
dence  that wholesale-retail beef margins  are  larger  in high-concentration 
cities  (Hall,  et al.  1979). 
Considering  the highly seasonal nature of cow-calf operations  (at least 
70%  of calves  are born in the first six months  of the year),  the  seasonal 
availability of pasturage,  and  seasonal beef  demand patterns,  overall subsec-
tor coordination is generally rated pretty high by  economists.  Considerable 
smoothing  of supplies  takes  place at the  grower  and,  especially,  feedlot 
stages.  Distributors  do  their part by  adjusting the  mix  of cuts  seasonally 
(more  roasts  in winter,  more  steaks  in summer)  and using relative prices  to 
clear  the  market  of  a  perishable product.  Even  consumer  freezer  inventories 
of beef help  subsector coordination a  bit. 
Summary 
The  proper delineation of a  market  requires  an  examination of the  demand 
for  a  product  (consumer behavior),  supply of a  product  (production side),  and 
geographic  scope.  Studies  of U.S.  household purchasing behavior  confirm that 
beef in fresh  or  frozen  form  is  a  distinct product.  Furthermore, -17-
consideration of the  technology of meatpacking production and distribution 
leads  to  the  conclusion that boxed beef has  become  a  separate  industry  from 
~arcass beef.  In terms  of geographic  scope,  beef cattle markets  are quite 
localized.  In the. principal area of the U.S.  for  fattening cattle  (west  of 
the Mississippi plus  the  Eastern Corn Belt),  fed cattle are bought by beef-
packers  in approximately  15  distinct markets .  However,  boxed beef and carcass 
beef are  sold into what  is essentially a  national market  (except  for  about  3% 
of the value  of U.S .. beefpacker  shipments  sold in international markets). 
Neither  imports  nor  foreign direct  investment have  broken  down  the U.S.  border 
as  a  boundary  for  domestic  sales  of beef. 
C.  Market  Concentration 
Recall  that market  concentration measures  the  number  and size  inequality 
among  buyers  or sellers in the  same  market.  While  numbers  of sellers are 
readily available for  most  stages  of the beef subsector,  numbers  of buyers  are 
not.  The ·sma11er  the  number  of buyers  or sellers,  the  more  concentrated  a 
market. 
There  are  several  indexes  of size  inequality used in market  structure 
analyses.  Data  on sales by  or purchases  of individual  firms  yields market 
shares;  the  larger the  shares  of leading firms,  the  more  concentrated the mar-
ket.  Finally,  a  statistic that provides  a  useful 'industry wide  indicator of 
seller concentration is the  four-firm concentration ratio  (CR4) ,  which  is 
simply  the  sum  of the  market  shares  of the  four  leading  firms  in a  market. 
Concentration ratios  can also be  obtained for  the  top  8,  20,  and  50  firms  in 
most  mining  and manufacturing  industries,  but  the  CR4  is by  far  the most 
widely  employed statistic in empirical  investigations of market  power. 
The  various  concentration measures  we  will examine  are useful  as  indi-
cators  of market  structure categories.  As  numbers  of firms  approach  one  and 
market  shares  or  CR4  approach  100%,  the  market  is evolving into  a  structural -18-
monopoly.  However,  concentration is not proof of monopolistic behavior  or 
performance.  That  is,  high concentration only  a  necessary condition of 
monopolistic pricing;  it is not  a  sufficient condition of monopolistic pric-
ing.  I~ is possible that a  monopolist might act in the  interest of consumers 
or  suppliers  and price at competitive levels.  It must  recognized that such  a 
"good monopoly"  would be  sacrificing returns  to its owners  by  doing  so . 
Between  the  extremes  of atomism  and monopoly lie structural oligopolies 
industries with  "small"  numbers  of sellers  and  "high"  concentration.  Oli-
gopoly  theory is much  more  complicated than either perfect competition or 
monopoly.  Yet,  most  oligopoly models  predict that the higher  the  degree  of 
concentration,  the  closer the price  to  the  monopoly price.  Considerable sta-
tistical evidence  and market  experiments  support  the  general  finding  that with 
up  to  three  or  four  sellers or with  CR4  above  40%  to  60%,  supranormal profits 
or supranormal prices are  generated. 
Beef Producer  Concentration 
From  a  twentieth century zenith of nearly seven million in the  mid  1930s, 
the  number  of u.s.  farms  and  ranches  has  fallen to barely over  two  million in 
1987.  Because  there  are  so  many  farms,  concentration is very  low.  Aggregate 
farm  sales concentration,  as  measured by  the  share  of sales by  the  top  5%,  has 
risen about  20%  since  the  end of World War  II'.  By  1982,  more  than  30%  of farm 
product sales  came  from  farms  with at least $500,000  in sales,  about triple 
the  share  of  farms  in 1949  with  the  same  constant-dollar sales  (Marion,  et al. 
1986:Chapter 1). 
In 1987,  there were  about  840,000  ranches  raising beef cattle of which 
380,000 had at least $10,000  in sales  (data  from  1987  Census  of Agriculture). 
The  latest information on concentration among  cattle producers  is that  the 
16,000  largest  (500  head or  more)  ranches  (1.6%  of the  total held  30%  of 
cattle inventories.  In 1982,  there were  970,000  ranches  primarily devoted to -19-
raising red-meat  animals  (cattle,  hogs,  and  sheep),  which was  40.5%  o'f  the 
total number  of U.S.  farms.  The  largest size class  of such  farms  (at least 
$500,000  in product sales)  accounted for  29%  of sales .of red-meat  animals.  A 
*  concentration index  for beef  cow  farms  rose  about  25%  from  1974  to  1982 ;  for 
fed beef,  the  index crept upward  only about  2%  (Marion,  et al.,  1986:13). 
Concentration among  the  three producer  stages  (cow-calf,  grow-out,  and 
feedlots)  is highest for  fed cattle.  The  number  of U.S.  feedlots  has  fallen 
drastically,'  from  121,000  in 1970  to  43,000  in 1988 .  In 1982,  larger feedlots 
(1,000  head or more  one-time  capacity)  accounted for  68%  of national  fed cat-
tle marketings,  which  was  double  the  share  in 1962.  By  1987,  the  share  of  the 
larger feedlots  had risen to  84%  in the  13  major  cattle states.  The  381  larg-
est  (8,000  head or more)  U.S .  feedlots  accounted for  50%  of fed cattle market-
ings  in 1982.  By  1987,  the  201  largest feedlots  (16,000 head capacity)  sold 
over half of the  fed cattle in the  13  major cattle states. 
Note  that these national concentration data understate  true concentration 
because  of  the  regional nature of meat  animal  markets.  Nevertheless,  even 
when  properly carved up  into perhaps  25  to  50  regional markets  for  live cat-
tle,  it is highly doubtful  that anyone market would have  less  than 1,000 
feeder cattle producers  or more  than  10%  of sales  accounted for by  the  top 
four  producers.  And  in areas  with  the  largest feedlots,  fed cattle CR4  is 
very likely under  40%.  These  are  atomistic markets  by  any  standard. 
Meatpacker  Concentration 
More  data is available  over  a  longer period for meatpacker  sales  concen-
tration than on  any  of the  other stages  of the beef subsector.  The  industry 
has  been the  subject of intense public scrutiny periodically since  the  l880s 
* The  Gini  coefficient. -20-
when  the  "Beef Trust"  was  formed.  The  Sherman Antitrust Act  was  passed in 
1890  partly as  a  result of concerns  expressed by  farm  groups  that meatpacker 
concentration was  excessive.  Yeager  (1982),  reports  that the  Big  Four  dressed 
beef concerns  handled  85%  of market sales in the  l880s. 
One  of the first targets of the  Federal Trade  Commission  (established in 
1914)  was  an  investigation of the  five  largest meatpacking  companies,  launched 
in 1918.  In 1920  the  Big  Five  signed a  consent decree with the  FTC  agreeing 
to  forego  further  consolidation and  to sell their stockyards,  railroad equip-
ment,  refrigerated warehouses,  and meat  stores.  The  Packers  and  Stockyards 
Administration was  formed  in 1921  to  regulate  the meatpacking  industry. 
Nicholls  (1941:333)  reports  that the  CR4  of federally  inspected cattle slaugh-
tering plants was  71%  in 1920;  it remained  in the  68%  to  73%  range until 1934, 
after which it slowly declined.  (Four-firm concentration of all slaughter, 
including wholesalers  and  on-farm was  around  45%  in 1934).  In 1965-1966,  the 
u .S.  National  Commission  on  Food Marketing  (1966)  devoted  one  of its ten tech-
nical studies  to  the  meat  industries.  The  remaining discussion focuses  on 
trends  in concentration since  1945. 
Number  of Slaughtering Plants 
The  number  of meatpacking plants  (beef,  pork,  veal,  lamb,  and mutton) 
recorded by  the  Census  Bureau ranged  from  2,154  to  2,992  during  1947-1977 
(Connor  1982),  dropping  to  1,780  in 1982.  In addition,  there were  about  1,300 
to  1,400 meat processing plants,  many  of which  slaughter.  The  year  1963  was 
the  peak  for meatpacking plants;  after 1963  the net number  fell by  2.8%  per 
year. 
The  number  of federally  inspected slaughtering plants has  declined since 
at least 1972  (P&SA-USDA  data).  Plants  slaughtering steers  and heifers fell 
from  807  in 1972  to  435  in 1985,  a  decline of 46%  in 13  years.  Pork slaugh-
tering plants also fell over  the  same  period by  33%.  Almost all of the -21-
decline  in steer/heifer slaughtering plants  was  absorbed by plants with animal 
slaughter of less  than  250,000 head.  The  number  of plants  slaughtering 
500,000  or more  steers  and heifers  increased from  3  in 1972  to  17  in 1985; 
moreover,  these largest beefpacking plants  now  account  for  53%  of total 
steer/heifer slaughter,  up  from  7%  in 1972. 
Meatpacking  Companies 
The  number  of U.S.  meatpacking  companies  rose  from  1,999  in. 1947  to  a 
peak of 2,833  in 1963  and declined to  1,658  in 1982  or by  2.9%  per year 
(Connor  1982,  1988).  In food processing generally the  number  of companies  has 
been declining at a  rate of about  4%  per year.  Most  meatpacking  companies  are 
single-plant firms,  some  of  them  operating  on  a  seasonal  or  custom-slaughter 
basis . 
.  By  1987,  after a  spate of very large mergers,  three  companies  have  come 
to  dominate  the meatpacking  industry  (Marion 1988).  They  are:  IBP  (formerly 
Iowa  Beef Processors,  now  a  subsidiary of Occidental  Petroleum);  Cargill 
(acquired MBPXL,  now  called Excel,  which  in turn had acquired Spencer  Beef  and 
Sterling Beef,  both among  the  top  10  beefpackers),  and  ConAgra  (acquired E.A. 
Miller,  Monfort  of Colorado  (4th largest beefpacker),  and  Swift  Independent 
(2nd largest porkpacker  and  3rd largest beefpacker).  The  Big  Three  today  con-
trol about  60%  of sales  in the beefpacking market: 
Seller Market  Concentration 
In 1920,  the  four  leading meatpackers  shared  46%  of the U.S.  market  for 
red meats  (Yeager  1981:243).  Cattle and hog  slaughter by  the  Big  Five  meat-
packers  reach their maximums  around  1918  at  55%  and  45%,  respectively 
(Nicholls  1941).  This  was  the height of control by  the  Beef.Trust.  Except 
for  a  slight rise in sheep  slaughter the  mid  1930s,  national concentration 
declined in meatpacking  thereafter.  From  41%  in 1947,  four-firm sales -22-
concentration in meatpacking reached its nadir in 1977  at 19%  (Table  1).  Con-
centration in beef,  veal,  and pork packing all reached historical  lows  in the 
1967-1977  period. 
Bureau of the  Census  data  show  that national  CR4  in beefpacking reached a 
low point of  25%  in 1977  and  then rose  to  44%  in 1982  (the latest year avail-
able).  I  estimate  that beefpacking  CR4  rose  to  74%  in 1987  (Table  1).  How-
ever,  because  several large beef fabricating plants  are classified as  whole-
saling operations,  the  Census  of Manufacturers  data increasingly understate 
the  true  level of sales  concentration in meatpacking.  Nevertheless,  a  72% 
increase  in CR4  in ten years  (1972-1982)  is very large by historical stan-
dards.  That  CR4  in beefpacking probably tripled between 1977  and  1987  is 
simply outside  the  realm of experience. 
P&SA  data on concentration of animals  slaughtered is  a  useful substitute 
measure.  These  data  include  fabricating  as  well  as  slaughtering plants,  but 
they may  understate concentration if the  leading packers  purchase higher-yield 
animals  or sell meat at a  higher unit price  than smaller  firms.  National 
four-firm concentration  (CR4)  for  steer(heifer slaughter was  28-29%  from  1972 
to  1977  (Table  2).  From  1977  to  1987  it rose  from  29%  to  67%,  an  increase of 
131%.  Such  an  increase  in CR4  is completely unprecedented in this  century. 
The  next highest decennial  increase in CR4  that can be  found  in the  food  p{o-
cessing industries is beer  (SIC  2082),  which  rose -from  51%  in 1972  to  79%  in 
1982,  a  54%  increase  (however,  if one  goes  back to  1954,  beer concentration 
rose by  204%  in 28  years).  Concentration of culled cow-bull  slaughter has 
varied from  9%  to  20%  since  1969. 
Porkpacking is much  less concentrated,  with  CR4  rising from  33%  in 1967 
(an  historical  low point)  to  39%  in 1982  according  to  Census  data.  P&SA  data 
show nearly constant hog  slaughter  CR4  of  32%  to  )5%  in the  1970s,  However, 
mergers  in 1987  increased the  CR4  to  37%.  The  top  three  companies  (IBP, -23-
Table  1 .  Concentration Ratios  for  U.S .  Meatpacking,  1947-1987. 
Industr~ or Product  Class  (SIC  Number) 
Meat- Meat  Beef  Veal  Lamb  Pork 
Year  packing  Processing 
(2011)  {201Jl  1201111  -.L20112~  -.L20113~  (20114) 
CR4  CR8  CR4  CR8  CR4  CR8  CR4  CR8  CR4  CR8  CR4 
Percent  1 
1947  41  54 
1954  39  51  36  43  49  56  61  74  42 
1958  34  46  31  38  41  50  60  69  39 
1963  31  42  16  23  26  34  36  44  54  67  36 
1967  26  38  15  22  26  35  37  50  57  73  33 
1972  22  37  19  26  30  42  27  46  55  76  37 
1977  19  37  23  30  25  36  32  56  58  82  37 
19822  29  43  19  28  44  55  55  74  59  86  39 
1987  54  68  74  92  85  99  76  99  40 
-- =  Not  available. 
1The  percent of industry value  of shipments  (or product class values  of 
product  shipments)  accounted for by  the plants of the  four  leading firms 
(CR4)  or eight  leading firms  (CR8) . 
2Estimated from  comparable  data in Table  2  and historical ratios . 
SOURCE:  U.S.  Bureau of the  Census.  1982  Census  of Manufacturers: 










Table  2.  Concentration of u.s.  Commercial  Livestock Slaughter,  1909-1988. 
Species  or Tvne 
Cattle I 
Steers & I  Cows  & I  Boxed II I  Proportion of 
Year  Heifers  Bulls  Beef  Calves  Sheep  Hogs  Beef Boxed 
Percent  1 
1909  36  44  34  0 
1910  38  46  32  0 
1911  38  49  35  0 
1912  38  49  34  0 
1913  41  54  35  0 
1914  40  55  36  0 
1915  44  56  38  0 
1916  47  57  39  0 
1917  53  60  41  0 
1918  55  59  45  0 
1920  49  34  62  42  0 
1930  48  46  68  38  0 
1940  43  46  66  44  0 
1950  36  35  64  41  0 
1951  32  35  63  41  0 
1952  34  36  64  39  0 
1953  34  39  63  38  0 
1954  32  38  62  39  0 
1955  31  37  61  41  0 
1956  30  37  62  '40  0 
1957  29  35  58  39  0 
1958  27  32  57  36  0 
1959  25  30  54  34  0 
1960  24  29  53  35  0 
1961  24  30  55  34  0 
1962  24  29  55  34 
1963  23  29  55  34 
1964  23  32  57  35 
1965  23  32  58  35 
1966  22  30  59  32 
1967  22  30  58  30 
1968  22  29  54  30 
1969  23  30  20  27  60  34 
1970  21  27  16  24  53  32 
1971  21  28  13  27  53  32 
1972  25  29  12  22  57  32  31 
1973  24  29  11  24  56  33 
























































































































lFrom  1909  to  1918,  the percent held by  the  Big  Five packers  (Armour,  Cudahy, 
Morris,  Swift  and Wilson),  where  commercial  slaughter  includes  federally 
inspected and other wholesale-retail establishments.  From  1920,  the  four 
largest firms  in each  species  or  type  (however,  in 1923  Armour  acquired 
Morris,  so  from  1923  to  1959  the  top  four  cattle-slaughtering firms  equal  the 
former  Big Five). 
Not  available 
E  =  Estimated 
SOURCE:  U.S.  House  of Representatives  (1980:197-306);  Nicholls  (1941); 
Packers  and  Stockyards  Administration-USDA,  Statistical Resume 
(various  years);  Marion  (1988);  Helmuth  (1984);  Hogeland  (1988). 
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ConAgra,  Excel)  now  hold  30%  to  40%  of the  fresh pork market.  Concentration 
i n  sheep  slaughter reached an historic high  in 1987  (Table  2) . 
As  was  argued above,  the  appearance  of boxed beef in the  1960s  created a 
new  industry  segment within beefpacking.  Prior to  1960 virtually all of the 
sales  of beefpacke'rs were  in carcass  form,  that is,  partially trimmed sides  or 
quarters  of refrigerated beef.  Carcass  sales  required grocery retailers to 
have  central meatcutting plants or extensive,  expert in-store butchering. 
Boxe'd  beef eliminates  a  great deal pf the retailer preparation of beef,  and 
the heavy plastic packaging facilitates  the  removal  of oxygen  thereby  extend-
ing shelf life by  several days.  Boxed beef sales  accounted for  31%'  of all 
beef sales  in 1972  and  is now  more  than  80%.  The  degree  of concentration is 
markedly higher  in boxed beefpacking than in steer/heifer slaughtering.  The 
boxed beefpacking ,CR4  rose  from  54%  in 1977  to  more  than  80%  today.  IBP, 
ConAgra,  and Cargill/Excel  today  account  for  about  75%  to  80%  of the boxed 
beef market. 
It is  important  to  note  that  the  market  shares  of the  Big Three meatpack-
ers  are fairly close  today.  Durin~the period of rapid growth  of boxed beef 
sales  in the  1970s,  IBP  held a  distinct market-share  lead,  but  the  ranks  and 
shares  of all the  other leading firms  changed rapidly.  Rapid  growth,  market 
; 
share  instability,  and the  entry of new  sellers are all factors  that discour-
age  cooperation in selling prices of beef.  Most  industry observers  are  con-
vinced that the  Big  Three  are  intensive rivals  on  the  selling side of their 
operations;  each has  been willing to  use price cutting to maintain or  increase 
its market  share.  The  failure  of  IBP  to  gain  a  dominant  market position in 
boxed beefpacking  (say,  a  market  share of 40%  or higher) ,  has  so  far kept 
price  leadership patterns  from  developing  (such  as  was  seen historically in 
the, steel and cigarette  industries). 
However ,  the  appearance  of significant excess  capacity in fabricated beef 
facilities  in the  1980s  implies  that the  threat of entry by  new  competitors  is -27-
much  diminished.  Several beef fabricating plants are  operating on  single 
shifts presently;  conversion to  double  shifts could be  effected quickly and 
would significantly lower  costs of production.  Without  some  distinct tech-
nological  advantage,  a  would-be  entrant will judge entry to  be  more  risky than 
when plant capacities are  more  fully utilized.  Moreover,  much  slower  growth 
in boxed beef is anticipated in the  future,  both because  of  consumer  demand 
conditions  and because  the shift from  carcass  to boxed beef is nearly  com-
plete.  Finally,  while  in the,1970s wholesaler-buyer concentration was  as  high 
or higher  than beefpacker  concentration  (see  Section B. 3  below),  by  the  late 
1980s  the  situation was  reversed.  For all these  reasons,  market  conditions 
today  lend themselves  to  greater cooperation in selling prices  than has  been 
possible since  the  early 1920s.  Significantly,  should further  mergers  take 
place  involving  the  Big Three,  especially a  merger  of  two  of  them,  conditions 
would be  ripe for price leadership to  develop  in beef selling. 
When  does  CR4  reach  a  level that is  "too high,"  that is,  a  critical level 
above  which  monopoly pricing is feasible  or  likely?  This  is  a  much  debated 
question in economics,  and  the  answer  depends  on  a  number  of factors besides 
mere  seller concentration levels.  For  example,  blockaded entry,  homogeneous 
commodities,  equal  access  of the  leading firms  to  the  same  technology of pro-
duction,  relatively low buyer concentration,  and  slow or declining industry 
growth are all factors  that facilitate pricing coilusion or cartel-like 
behavior.  Given  these  conditions,  numerous  studies  of the  food manufacturing 
and  other manufacturing  industries  strongly suggest  that the critical level of 
four-firm concentration lies between  40%  and  60%.  By  the  time  CR4  reaches 
80%,  pricing can usually be  maintained at monopoly  levels.  It appears  that 
beefpacking has  recently passed beyond  the critical threshold level of seller 
concentration.  Moreover,  the  other market  conditions  necessary for monopol-
istic pricing to  develop  are  largely satisfied in the beefpacking  industry of 
the  late 1980s.  (These  are necessary,  not sufficient conditions ,  for  the -28-
potential members  of a  cartel may  still refuse  to  join despite  the profit 
potential for  doing  so). 
Buyer  Concentration of Meatpackers 
Beef marketing is essentially national in scope  for  the  leading firms, 
but meatpacker procurement is far more  localized.  Most  hogs  and cattle are 
purchased within 100  miles  of the  slaughter plant to  avoid dehydration and 
shrinkage  and  to  ensure  "just-in-time"  delivery'.  Ward  (1988)  found  that  80% 
of cattle were  slaughtered within 150  miles  of packing plants  in the  Plains 
States  and  135  miles  of Midwestern packing plants.  Marion  (1988)  and Quail, 
et al.  (1986)  identified 13  cattle procurement regions  for  the  25  u.S.  states 
west of the Mississippi but  including  the  Eastern Corn Belt.  For  example,  the 
Denver  region includes  Colorado  and the western half of Nebraska.  In these  13 
regions,  average  four-firm buyer concentration  (BCR4)  was  just under  50%  in 
1971,  rose  slowly to  57%  in 1978,  and  jumped to  82%  in 1986;  the beefpacking 
mergers  of 1987 have  likely raised averaged BCR4  to  90%. 
Ward  (1988)  found  some  cattle procurement  studies  that identified signif-
icantly smaller buying regions.  For  example,  he  identified southwest Kansas, 
the  Oklahoma  panhandle,  the  Texas  North Plains,  and  the  Texas  South Plains  as 
four  separate buying  regions.  However,  Quail,  et al.,  considered this  to be 
one beef procurement market  centered on Amarillo. ·While  most  authors  consider 
state boundaries  too  small  on  average,  P&SA  data on  BCR4  in each state are 
published regularly.  In 1985,  the  10  leading steer/heifer states had  BCR4s 
ranging  from  a  low of  72.3%  (Nebraska)  to  99.9%  (Colorado). 
Meat Wholesaler  Concentration 
The  question to be  addressed here  is  the  degree  of buyer concentration 
faced by beefpackers  when  they sell carcass beef or boxed beef to distribu-
tors.  If meat wholesaler concentration is high,  then the potential power  over -29-
selling prices  for beef cannot be  easily exercised by beefpackers.  '  That is, 
the bargaining power  of meat wholesalers  may  act as  a  countervailing force 
when  the  leading beefpackers  attempt  to  raise selling prices  above  competitive 
levels.  This  is  the  same  argument  often used in justifying the  concerted 
activities of farmer bargaining cooperatives where  processor concentration is 
high. 
Beef sold to  consumers  in grocery stores  is distributed through  two 
wholesale  channels.  Th,e  largest portion is purchased by  employees  or agents 
of the major U.S.  grocery chains  or grocery stores affiliated with cooperative 
or voluntary wholesaler organizations.  These  retailer buyers  may  negotiate 
purchases  for all the  regions  in which  the  chain operates,  but  a  more  typical 
pattern is  for purchasing to be  delegated to  a  divisional meat buyer. 
Retailer  "divisions"  correspond  to  a  major metropolitan area and  the  surround-
ing region served by  the retailer's warehouse.  Typical divisions  are  Northern 
California  (centered in San Francisco),  Chicago  (including portions  of 
Wisconsin,  Illinois,  and Indiana),  and Washington-Baltimore.  A  minor portion 
~  beef is sold through  independent  grocery stores or chains  too  small  to  own 
their own wholesale distribution facilities.  In this  case,  retailers purchase 
their beef  from  specialty meat wholesalers which  operate  in regions  that cor-
respond closely to  the  retail-chain divisions just described.  Thus,  beef sold 
in grocery stores  is mainly  sold at wholesale  in approximately 40  to  60  geo-
graphic  regions  of the United States. 
How  concentrated are wholesale buyers  in these  regions?  Nationally, 
grocery store sales  are not highly concentrated.  The  top  20  grocery store 
chains  account  for  35%  to  40%  of sales  today,  which  is  about  double  the  share 
they held in 1948  (Marion,  et al.  1986 :332,  excluding A  & P).  However,  when 
measured at the more  appropriate metropolitan-area level,  four-firm  concentra-
tion  (CR4)  in the  54  largest city markets  averages  about  61%  (projected from 
Marion,  et al.  1986:307  and Cotterill 1989).  In 1958  the  CR4  in the  54 -30-
largest U.S.  metropolitan areas  was  only 48%.  Thus,  within major U.S.  cities, 
grocery sales concentration increased almost  30%  in the last 30  years. 
Somewhat  less  information is available about  specialty meat wholesaler 
concentration.  About  the  only reliable source  is  a  USDA  study of grocery 
wholesaler  concentration conducted in the early 1970s  for  14 appropriate  geo-
graphic  regions  of the United States.  General-line wholesalers'  CR4  averaged 
73%  in the  14 markets,  but this  type  of wholesaler handles little refrigerated 
beef.  The  CR4  for  specialty meat wholesalers  averaged about  33%;  numerous 
mergers  in grocery wholesaling since  then may  have  raised CR4  to  around  40% 
today. 
In summary,  beefpacker salespersons  face  moderate  to high  levels  of 
wholesale-meat-buyer concentration when  attempting  to  sell carcass  or boxed 
beef.  On  average,  the  top  four  grocery  chains  purchase  55%  to  60%  of the beef 
sold directly to  integrated retailer-wholesalers.  Of  the beef sold through 
the  separate distribution channel  serving nonintegrated grocery stores,  the 
four  largest buyers  command  about  40%  of sales.  These  levels  of buyer  con-
centration are high  enough  to provide  significant,  if not  overwhelming, 
countervailing power  against  the  tendency of leading packers  to  raise beef 
prices.  However,  if beefpacker seller concentration were  to rise much  farther 
above  present levels,  the  countervailing power  of wholesalers will count  for 
little. 
D.  Product Differentiation 
Fresh beef is  among  the  most  homogeneous  processed food products.  It is 
true  that producers have been spending substantial  funds  ($30  million in 1987) 
for  generic advertising and promotion of beef to U.S.  consumers,  but that 
amount  pales by  comparison with the  $35  billion spent by  food  and  tobacco 
manufacturers  on brand advertising in 1987  (IRS  data).  Some  growers  have 
attempted true product differentiation by branding their beef  (in cooperation -31-
with  a  packer)  and  touting  some  special quality characteristics  such as 
"organic"  or  "natural."  These  efforts are  on  a  small  scale  so  far,  and it is 
rather early to  tell how  large  consumer  demand  is for  these  specialty  p~o­
ducts,  which  typically sell at 25  to  50%  retail price premiums. 
In the U.S.  food  system generally,  manufacturers  are  responsible  for most 
product differentiation.  Through  a  combination of packaging,  mass-media 
advertising,  and promotions  aimed at consumers  or distributors,  consumer-
product  food manufacturers  attempt  to  maintain or expand their market  shares 
by building brand loyalty.  However,  meatpackers  are  largely prevented from 
stimulating packer brand loyalty because final wrapping  and merchandising is 
in the hands  of  food retailers.  Retailers  use  their meat  and produce  depart-
ments  to create  a  quality  image  for  their stores.  Meat  items  are  often 
featured in retailer newspaper  advertisements  to create  a  low-price  image  as 
well.  Most  retailers promote beef through shelf display methods,  on-call 
store butchers,  fat content  labeling,  heavy  trimming,  preparation of highly 
convenient prepared meat  items  (skewered shish-ka-bob,  ready-to-bake  meat-
loaves,  marinated grilling meats,  etc.),  and  through featuring high-grade 
(USDA  prime  or  choice)  meat  cuts. 
The  majority of consumers  report that USDA  quality grades  are  an  impor-
tant guide  to beef purchases  (Petritz,  et a1.  1982).  Many  consumers  spend 
time  inspecting beef cuts  for fat color and marbling,  which are visible fea-
tures  that correspond  somewhat with USDA  quality grades.  Grade-consciousness 
is known  to  increase with household  incomes  and  consumer  education levels.  In 
retail outlets where  USDA  grades  are not featured,  consumers  rely on  the 
store's reputation or assurances  of beef quality as  a  guide  to  purchasing;  in 
these  cases,  quality assurance  is akin to  the private label  ("store brand") 
programs  in the  packaged foods  area.  In either case,  it is the  government's 
or retailer's reputation that conveys  a  "summary  signal"  of quality to  most 
consumers.  In the  packaged goods  area where  inspection of the  contents  by -32-
consumers  is often impossible,  it is  the manufacturer's  trademark that conveys 
that  summary  signal  to  consumers.  In sum,  as  long  as  present fresh meat 
retail merchandising methods  continue  there  is little scope  for meatpacker 
brand differentiation of fresh beef at the  consumer  level. 
That  is not  to  say that building brand loyalty for beef is  impossible. 
Some  distributors  may  already be  wedded  to  the boxed beef products  of particu-
lar meatpackers;  that is ,  some  wholesalers  or retailers may  be willing to pay 
a  few  pennies  per pound more  for  the boxed beef of certain packers because 
they perceive  a  level or consistency of 'quality absent  in other  pa~kers'  pro-
ducts  or delivery methods.  Moreover,  many  other meat products  that were 
formerly undifferentiated now  command  considerable  consumer brand loyalty. 
Bacon,  formerly  sliced on  custom basis by retailers,  has  been packaged  and 
moderately promoted to  consumers  for  several decades.  Most  turkeys  are 
frozen,  packaged,  and branded by  the processor;  the  Swift brand  commands  a 
distinct retail price premium  and yet has  a  strong consumer  following.  Pack-
aged trays  of chicken parts  now  carry the  Perdue,  Holly  Farms,  and other 
recognized  trademarks.  Particularly interesting is the price premium obtained 
for whole  Perdue  chickens  in the .Northeast  through  a  combination of humorous 
TV  advertising and  a  feed mix  that develops  a  deep  orange  fat that is  recog-
nizable by  consumers. 
The  main  lesson from  these  analogous  meat  products  is that packer packag-
ing of  consumer  cuts  or  some  physical difference  r~adily observed by  consumers 
at retail are necessary conditions  for  creating brand loyalty.  Packaging 
frozen beef at the plant is one  alternative that will probably meet with con-
siderable  consumer  resistance because  of the purple  tone  that develops with 
freezing.  Prepackaged consumer  cuts of fresh beef that are  able  to  claim a 
significant attribute of value  to  consumers will likely be  the easiest route 
to  packer branding.  Some  smaller packers  marketing so-called "light"  or 
"organic"  beef appear  to be  leading the way,  but it is difficult to tell if a -33-
mass-market  can be  developed  on  such differences.  Another  feasible  alterna-
tive is  to  establish packer-owned retail outlets,  either separate specialty 
stores  or  in-store  "boutiques"  clearly identified with  the packers  trademark. 
This  is actually a  return to  the  method  employed by  Swift  and  other packers 
before  the  1920  Consent  Decree  forced divestiture of packer-owned store;  now 
that the  decree has  been nullified,  such  a  strategy is legal. 
Successful packer differentiation will also  require distributor coopera-
tion in apply different margins  for .prepackaged beef  than they  do  for boxed 
beef packaged at the  store.  In general,  percentage retail mark-ups  are higher 
for highly differentiated foods  than for  less processed items;  in other words, 
manufacturer margins  and distributor margins  are positively correlated  (Connor 
and Weimer,  1987).  The  current retailer practice of applying uniform mark-ups 
to all fresh meats  inhibits  the  introduction of packer branded beef. 
E.  Economies  of Scale  and Other Barriers  to  Entry 
Entry barriers are necessary for market power  to be maintained in the 
long  run.  Without barriers,  entry will  increase  the  numbers  of sellers to  the 
point that cooperative pricing or output decisions  becomes  infeasible. 
Entry barriers are  of many  sorts.  Effective product differentiation may 
itself act as  a  barrier to  new  entry.  Once  well established,  habitual pur-
chases  by  consumers  of their favored brand become  expensive  to  dislodge.  That 
is,  the unit cost of switching  consumer  loyalties  to would-be  entrants  is 
typically higher  than the  cost of reinforcing repetitive purchases  to  incum-
bent  firms.  Developing  a  new brand involves  large  sunk costs,  which  creates 
an exit barrier.  Moreover,  retailers are often loath to  carry more  than  a  few 
brands  in any product category.  In the  fresh poultry area,  one  observes  only 
one  or  two  brands  being carried in a  given store alongside  the  stores'  own 
offerings of unbranded poultry.  When  local grocery concentration is high  (the -34-
CR4  in metropolitan areas  now  averages  about  60%),  the  opportunities  for 
multiple brands  to coexist are  limited. 
A  second source  of barriers  to  entry is cost conditions.  A minimum  opti-
mal  scale  that is very large relative to  the  size of the product market  or  a 
procurement market  for  an essential input is  a  barrier to  entry given that 
would-be  entrants must  often start up  at suboptimal product levels. 
Economies  of scale  do  not  appear  to  inhibit entry into most  producer 
levels.  Cow-calf  operat~ons are quite small,  with average herd sizes  of only 
about  150 head.  Grower-stocker  operations  are  a  bit larger,  but still tiny 
relative to  total market  output.  In some  areas,  access  to pasture or water 
rights  may  slow entry or  expansion.  The  size of some  feedlots  may  indicate 
substantial  economies  of scale  are present.  The  largest  300  to  400  feedlots 
control  about  50%  of national marketings  of fed cattle,  but it is unusual  for 
even  the  largest feedlot  in a  given  pr~curement market  to  control more  than  5% 
of the  supply.  However,  constraints  on  the water  supply or effluent treatment 
may  prevent or  slow entry of rival feedlots  in some  areas. 
The  principal stage of the beef subsector where  economies  of scale are 
most prevalent is in beefpacking  (Marion  1988,  Ward  1988).  A specialized 
steer/heifer packing plant with  a  capacity of 250,000 head per year  exhausts 
most  economies  of scale  (reaches  minimum  optimal  scale).  Economies  of scale 
are  greater  in boxed beef fabricating plants  -- probably between  ~OO,OOO and 
1,000,000 head per year.  Thus,  an  integrated slaughtering-fabricating plant 
would utilize  2%  to  4%  of the  U.S.  fed cattle supply.  Optimal  size meatpack-
ing plants built in the  1950s  accounted for  only  0 . 1%  to  0.9%  of national  sup-
ply  (Connor,  et al.  1985:154). 
From  the point of view of procurement,  a  single,  optimally sized,  inte-
grated slaughtering-fabricating plant represents  20%  of the cattle supply or 
more  in 10  of 13  major cattle regions  (Marion 1988).  Thus,  four  such plants 
could soak up  80%  of  the  total supply of steers  and heifers.  Since  the late -35-
1970s,  excess  capacity has  been widespread in the beefpacking  industry.  Lead-
ing beefpackers have  large,  modern plants  ready  to  come  into production at 
short notice.  This  may  well have  discouraged entry by  new  firms.  There  is  a 
substantial body  of theory that shows  that excess  capacity maintained for  . 
strategic  (entry-forestalling)  purposes  can be  as  effective or more  effective 
in preventing entry than limit-pricing strategies. 
Absolute  capital barriers  into beefpacking are  formidable.  A  new  inte-
grated slaughter-fabricating plant of 500,000  capacity costs  $20  to  $40  mil-
lion (Marion 1988).  Of  course,  .by  comparison with  many  other industries 
(automobiles,  beer,  corn fructose)  where  optimal plants  today cost around  $500 
million,  absolute capital size  in beefpacking is modest.  Generally,  large 
absolute  investment sizes are not significant barriers unless  the major  estab-
lished packers  can borrow capital at preferred rates  compared  to  smaller  firms 
or potential entrants.  IBP  and  Excel,  which  are parts  of much  larger enti-
ties,  may well have  superior borrowing positions because  of their percent  com-
panies'  cash  flow  or financial reputations. 
Future  technological  changes  appear  to call for  ever larger economies  of 
scale  in beefpacking.  Several  developments  in animal  genetics point to  the 
development  of cattle with more  uniform weights,  configurations,  and  anatom-
ical structure.  Ultrasonic  and magnetic  systems will aid feedlots  and packers 
to  reduce heterogeneity within lots of cattle.  Indeed,  genetic cloning of 
cattle,  which has  already begun  on  a  small  scale,  holds  out  the promise  of 
virtually identical meat  animals.  Absolute uniformity of material  inputs  is 
the  food  engineer's  dream.  Faster production lines with greater use  of auto-
mated slaughtering equipment would  then become  possible.  Superior sensing and 
control  instruments,  computerization,  and  even robotization could be  imple-
mented if cattle were  more  uniform. 
On  the  other hand,  labor,  sanitation,  and  inspection considerations  may 
place limitations  on the  adoption of speedier slaughtering methods.  The  large -36-
fine  levied on  IBP  by  the  Federal Occupational  Safety and Health Administra-
tion  (OSHA)  spotlighted severe  and apparently rising worker  safety problems. 
The  proposed  Stre~mlined Inspection System proposed by  the USDA  for certain 
la~ge beefpacking plants might have  increased labor productivity by  as  much  as 
40%  (Ingersol  1989).  However,  concerns  about  a  possible  reduction in food 
safety levels recently led USDA  to withdraw  the proposal.  Doubtless,  new 
techniques will also be  developed to  attenuate  the  repetitiveness  and  danger-
ous  work conditions  facing beef industry workers and  to  speed safety inspec-
tion of beef. 
Changing  Concentration 
The  extraordinary jump  in beefpacker concentration deserves  some  atten-
tion.  In some  ways,  the  increase does  not fit historical patterns of changing 
concentration in the  food manufacturing  industries.  Previous  empirical  inves-
tigations  found  that increasing concentration was  positively related to  the 
intensity of consumer  advertising effort and negatively related to  the  initial 
level of concentration  (Connor,  et al.  1985:108-113).  Certainly the first 
factor  is not relevant to beefpacking,  and  the  initially low  CR4  would  account 
for  only  5  percentage points of the  increase  observed. 
Economies  of scale have  often been identified as  sources  of increased 
concentration.  The  theory is that scale economies that increase faster  than 
industry sales  force  smaller  firms  (mainly  owners  of smaller single plants)  to 
exit because  their higher unit costs  cause  them  to  become  noncompetitive  in 
pricing.  There  is little empirical  evidence  that supports  this  theory in the 
case  of the  food  manufacturing  or  general manufacturing literature. 
Neither plant nor multiplant economies  of scale justify the high observed 
levels of concentration in beefpacking  today.  If each of the  top  four  meat-
packers  owned  one  optimal-size boxed-beef plant,  CR4  would be at most  16%; 
assuming  th~t three plants  (the upper  estimate  from  studies  of three other -37-
food processing industries)  would exhaust all multiplant economies,  CR4  would · 
be  in the  24%  to  48%  range.  Thus,  plant and multiplant economies  of scale  can 
account  for  at most half of the  increase in beefpacker concentration observed 
since  the mid  1970s.  Moreover,  the wage  advantages  once  enjoyed by  IBP  have 
spread through union give-backs  to most  of the  other boxed beef packers. 
Mergers  have played a  decisive role  in increasing concentration in beef-
packing.  IBP,  founded  in 1961,  made  its first acquisition in the  same  year 
(Rose  1989).  More  slaughtering plants were  acquired in 1963  (Iowa Pork),  1966 
(Sioux Quality),  1967  (two  plants),  1969  (Blue  Ri~bon,  which  was  successfully 
challenged by  the U.S.  Department  of Justice),  1976  (Madison  Foods,  Columbia 
Foods),  1982  (two  plants),  1985  (two  plants),  1988  (Heinhold),  and  1989  (one 
plant).  Of  the  10  high-volume beef plants  currently operated by  IBP,  four 
were  acquisitions.  ConAgra  was  incorporated as  Nebraska  Consolidated Mills 
Comp~ny in 1919  and acquired numerous  grain and flour mills  throughout its 
history.  It has  taken -control of dozens  of poultry and  fish processing plants 
since  1971.  Entry  into  the beef industry was  initiated by its 1983  acquisi-
tion of Armour  Food  Company  for  $182  million;  Armour  was  one  of the  Big  Five 
packers  in 1900.  More  beef assets were  purchased in 1985  (Northern States 
Beef)  and  1987  (E.A.  Miller,  Monfort,  Swift  Independent).  ConAgra  is by far 
the  most  diversified firm  in the beefpacking  industry  (11  slaughter plants), 
with major market positions  in .beef,  pork,  lamb,  poultry,  processed meats, 
fish,  and beef feedlots.  The  Excel  division of Cargill traces its origins  to 
Excel  Packaging  (founded 1936),  Missouri  Beef  Packers  (1966),  and Kansas  Beef 
Industries  (incorporated from  six predecessors  in 1969).  In 1964,  Missouri 
Beef  and Kansas  Beef merged to  form  MBPXL.  Cargill outbid ConAgra  for  MBPXL 
in 1979  and has  since made  beef acquisitions  in 1983  (Spencer),  1986  (Del-
Pero) ,  and  1987  (Sterling).  Cargill also has  investments  in pork,  meat  pro-
cessing,  eggs,  and feedlots.  In summary,  around  60%  to  70%  of the beefpacking 
capacity of the  Big Three  today was  bought rather than built.  There  is  no -38-
evidence  that food  industry mergers  have  been accompanied by post-merger effi-
ciency  increases  (Connor  and Geithman 1988). 
An  area that is little researched is  the  economies  of multiplant  owner-
ship  in beefpacking  and  economies  of scope  (from mu1tispecies  operations). 
There  are  several  arguments  from  economic principles that would  lead one  to 
expect such  economies  to exist  (Nelson 1985);  moreover,  there  is spotty evi-
dence  of multiplant advantages  in other  food processing industries  (Connor 
et a1 .  1985).  If so,  sing1e~p1ant,  single-line beefpackers will suffer cost 
disadvantages  that will eventually  cau~e them  to exit the ,industry,  unless 
they find smaller niches  outside  the  main grocery store  channel  that they can 
profitably serve. 
F .  Market  Structure and Market  Power 
Producer Level 
The  market  structures of the  cow-calf and  grower-stocker levels  of the 
beef subsector  do  not permit  them  to  acquire market  power  in the  long run. 
Concentration is very  low;  cattle of the  same  yield and grade  are essentially 
homogeneous;  and scale  economies  or other barriers appear  to be  absent. 
Feeder cattle operators  have all the  symptoms  of classical price-takers. 
There  is no  hint in rates of return data or  economic  analyses  of persistent 
competitive problems  at these  stages. 
Based on market  structure features,  feedlots  may well be  evolving into 
positions  to  become  price-makers,  particularly on  the buying side  of their 
operations,  but  on  the whole  they appear  to  have  not yet arrived there .  Con-
centration levels  are  low  enough  in most  feeder cattle markets  to prevent col-
lusive pricing arrangements  to persist for  long.  Economies of scale are  large 
in absolute  terms,  but still modest relative  to market  size;  farm  feedlots  in 
many  areas  are cost competitive with  the  larger commercial  feedlots.  It is 
t rue  that feedlot operators,  because  of their frequent  contact with packer -39-
buyers,  may well have  occasional  information advantages  when buying  feeder 
cattle relative to  cattle sellers,  particularly nontransaction information. 
On  the  other hand,  sellers appear  to be well  supplied with up-to-date  cash and 
futures  price transactions  information on live cattle.  This  is not  to  say 
that more  producer  information on daily beef  (particularly boxed beef)  prices 
would not  improve  price discovery at this  stage.  Continuing buyer-seller 
loyalty doubtless  plays  a  role in pricing offers of feedlots,  but this  may 
well be  innocuous  if it represents  a  reduction in search costs  for  information 
on herd quality. 
Meatpacker  Procurement 
Market  structure conditions  lend themselves  to  monopsony pricing by meat-
packers,  at least sporadically and in some  procurement markets·,  if not all. 
Moreover,  there  is  a  surprising consensus  among  the  empirical studies  that 
have  examined  the relationship of fed cattle prices  to  levels of 
concentration. 
Most  fed cattle are purchased by beefpackers  or  their agents within 100 
miles  of the beefpacking plant to which  the cattle are  shipped.  Bids  and 
offers  are  typically made  at feedlots  after personal  inspection of the cattle 
in a  pen.  (Less  than  10%  of all fed cattle are  now purchased at auction mar-
kets  or  terminal  cash markets,  though  in some  areas  of the U.S.  the  percentage 
is higher).  The  process  is  one  of direct negotiation,  and· the  delivery  terms 
and price are  determined by bargaining  ("private  treaty").  Most  large beef-
packing plants have  five  to  ten buyers.  A  1979  sample  survey  found  that in 
the  Plains  States,  about  40%  of the  feedlots  had four  or  few  packer buyers 
bidding  on cattle during  the  month  of July;  in Midwestern feedlots  about  80% 
had four  or  fewer bidders.  On  a  daily or weekly basis,  the  number  of bidders 
would be  fewer,  and since  1979  many  plants have  closed. -40-
With  sufficient numbers  of bidders  and balanced  information,  in general 
direct trading methods  result in moderately accurate price efficiency and 
equitable prices.  However,  when buyers  are as  few  as  two  or three  and when 
buyers  have  significantly more  information than sellers,  prices  are  likely to 
be below competitive  levels.  There  is  an  income  transfer  from  producers  to 
packers  (Marion,  et al.  1986:99). 
A  study by Ward  (1988)  explained variation in 334  observations  of July 
1979  fed cattle prices  (on  a  live-weight basis)  collected from  31  feedlots  or 
marketing agents.  The  key result of interest is that  ~ach additional buyer 
raised the price of fed cattle by  22  to  28  cents per hundredweight,  all other 
things held equal  (among  the  "other things"  were  daily wholesale  carcass 
price,  August  futures  contract price for live cattle,  the  degree  of forward 
purchasing,  USDA  grade,  yield,  dressing percentage,  lot size,  and region).  In 
Ward's  sample,  the  number  of buyers  ranged  from  5  to  11  in each of six cattle 
buying regions  (a region was  specified as  ranging  from  3  to  23  counties).  The 
six regions  included parts of Kansas,  Oklahoma,  and Texas.  Comparing  the  most 
concentrated with the  least concentrated procurement markets,  Ward's  results 
indicate that 1979  fed cattle prices were  depressed by $1.30  to  $1.70  per  cwt. 
by buyer  concentration.  Based on average  1979  Omaha  choice  steers price of . 
$67.67  per hundredweight,  cattle prices were  reduced by at most  1.9  to  2.5% 
His  model  explained up  to  96%  of the variation in ·prices. 
Menkhaus,  et al.  (1981)  also  studied the  impact  of beefpacker concentra-
tion on  fed cattle prices.  Annual  data on  the  average  price of choice  grade 
slaughter steers were  collected in 12  states for  the year  1972  and  15  states 
for  the year  1977.  Also  developed was  the  CR4  for beefpackers  in each state. 
Their model  explained 79%  of the variation in prices across  states.  In both 
years,  CR4  was  found  to be  significantly negatively related to  fed cattle 
prices  (controlling for state slaughter surplus  or deficit,  meatcutters' 
wages,  choice  grade  steer carcass prices,  and average  feedlot size).  Thus, -41-
the more  concentrated  (fewer buyers)  procurement,  the  lower  the prices paid 
for  fed cattle in the state.  Menkhaus,  et al.  found  that for  each  10  percent-
age  point  increase  in the  CR4  of meatpackers,  the price of choice  fed steers 
(900-1100  pounds)  fell by  $0.145  per cwt.  in 1972  and by  $0.22  per cwt.  in 
1977.  The  range  on  CR4  across  the  states was  about  30  percentage points,  so 
based on average  Omaha  choice steer prices,  fed cattle prices were  depressed 
by at most  1.2%  in 1972  and by  1.6%  in 1977.  These  estimates  are slightly 
lower  than Ward's.  States  may be  too  small  to accurately reflect the 
boupdaries  of cattle  p~ocurement markets  (Williamson,  et al.  1982). 
Finally,  Quail,  et al.  (1986)  examined annual  average  fed cattle prices 
in 13  regional markets  covering  25  states for  the years  1971  to  1980.  They 
also  found  that regional beefpacker concentration had  a  significant negative 
influence  on prices paid to  cattlemen.  If one  compares  buyer  concentration in 
one  region with another region with  a  CR4  that is  10%  higher,  fed cattle 
prices were  $0.14 per cwt.  lower  in the  more  concentrated region.  The  mean 
level of CR4  for  1976-1980 varied from  30%  to  95%.  Thus,  comparing prices  for 
the  range  in CR4,  cattle prices  for  1976-80 were  reduced by  1.7%  because  of 
buyer concentration.  The  authors  also note that the rise in 'CR4  in their  sam-
ple regions  from  1971  and  1980  caused cattle prices  to  fall  $0.19  per  cwt. ,  or 
by  about  0.3%,  a  loss  of $45  to  $50  million for  feedlot operators.  Quail,  et 
al .  were  able  to control for  several  other factors likely to affect cattle 
prices,  viz.,  the proportion of  larg~ feedlots  and plants,  beef shipping 
costs,  meatpacker  wage  rates,  fed cattle surplus  or deficit,  and  the  change  in 
market  shares  among  meatpackers. 
Each  of the  three statistical studies  of the  relationships  of buyer  con-
centration to  fed cattle prices report  the  same  basic  finding.  When  comparing 
two  different market  situations--one with large  numbers  of cattle buyers  (low 
buyer  concentration)  and  one  with small  numbers  of buyers  (high concentra-
tion)--high concentration is associated with significantly lower  live cattle -42-
prices.  Is it fair to  attribute lower cattle prices  to  the noncompetitive 
behavior  (market  power)  of cattle buyers  when  they have  few  rivals bidding for 
a  given supply of cattle?  Are  there  limitations  on  these statistical studies 
that call for qualifications  of the market  power  finding? 
There  are  two  possible limitations.  First,  each of the  studies  is 
"cross-sectional";  that is,  each  study used data from  a  slice of time  that 
ranged  from  one  month  (Ward)  to  five  years  (Quail,  et al.).  Moreover,  each 
study drew  on  data from  1972  to  1980,  and  one  may  question whether  the results 
can be  applied to  the  situation facing  the u.s.  beef subsector in the  late 
1980s,  especially given the  great increase in packer concentration in the last 
ten years .  It is  a  common  caution in interpreting statistical results of 
these kinds  to be  careful in extending the results beyond  the  range  of the 
data.  The  reply to this concern is that all of the  st~dies included  some  cat-
tle buying regions  that were  already as  concentrated in the  1970s  as  the most 
concentrated regions  of the late 1980s.  In that sense,  we  are  safe  in apply-
ing results  from  1970s  data to  the present day.  If concentration had declined 
since  the  1970s,  then severe doubts  would exist in applying  the  findings  to 
the  late 1980s .  It is only by  repeating  such analyses with data  from  the  late 
1980s  that we  can be  absolutely sure  that the cattle buyers'  market  power  is 
actually being exercised,  but  the burden of proof now  lies with  those  who  deny 
the  existence of such  a  relationship. 
Second,  a  more  subtle criticism of the  three statistical studies  is what 
is called "specification error".  In brief,  this criticism means  that if some 
factor associated with  the  measure  of buyer concentration is omitted from  the 
models,  then the  effect of concentration on cattle prices  may  be  overestimated 
or underestimated  ("biased").  For  example,  if the beefpacking plants  in high-
concentration areas  are  systematically more  efficient,  then concentration's 
eff ect  on cattle prices  is biased.  However,  in this  case  we  may  point to  the 
model  of Quail ,  et al. ,  which  included additional variables  that capture  the -43-
size  (a proxy for  efficiency)  of meatpacking plants  and feedlots  in the  cattle 
procurement  region.  Therefore,  the negative effect of concentration on cattle 
found by Quail,  et al .  cannot be  due  to  the  greater efficiency of large-scale 
slaughter plants  (though  such bias may  be  found  in the  other  two  studies). 
Another  example  of specification error might be  the  failure  to  control for  the 
costs  of feedlot-to-plant cattle assembly.  If packer concentration is  system-
atically higher  (or has  increased faster)  in regions  where  plants are  more 
efficiently located to  reduce  average  assembly costs,  then the  concentration-
price relationship  may  be biased.  The  studies  reviewed did not directly mea-
sure  assembly  costs,  so it is  a  question to be  addressed by  future  research 
whether  concentration and  assembly costs  are correlated and,  if correlated, 
whether  the concentration-price relationship is weakened. 
To  sUmmarize,  buyer concentration has  had significant depressing effect 
on fed cattle prices.  Considering their diverse  time  periods,  data sources, 
and methods  of analysis,  the  three  studies  surveyed are  remarkably consistent 
in their findings.  In all three studies,  fed cattle prices were  from  1.2%  to 
2.5%  lower  each year  in the most  concentrated cattle procurement  regions  com-
pared to  the  most  competitive  regions.  However,  under  the  average  concentra-
tion conditions prevailing in the  1970s,  cattle prices were  about  0.5  to  1.0% 
lower  than they would have been under perfectly competitive conditions . 
Because  the price of fed cattle accounted for  57%  ·of the retail price of 
choice beef, . the  impact  on  consumer beef prices  from  the  exercise of buying 
power  by beefpackers  in the  1970s  was  at most  0.6%  to  1.4%;  the  likely average 
impact was  to  raise retail beef prices by  0 . 3%  to  0.6% .  It may  also be  noted 
that nine  other statistical studies  reviewed by Ward  (1988:166-170)  found  that 
buyer concentration was  inversely related to  the prices  of hogs  and slaughter 
lambs.  Three  of these  found  that there was  a  significant decline in hog 
prices  in the  area surrounding  a  recently closed porkpacking plant;  the price 
effects  lasted for  several weeks  at least. -44-
Selling Prices  of Meatpackers 
Assuming  that meatpackers  want  to  maximize profits,  there are  several 
ways  of doing it.  Lowering prices paid for major  inputs  such as  slaughter 
animals  is  one  tactic.  Raising selling prices is another.  Both pricing 
strategies would  cause packer margins  to  widen.  (Stimulating sales  or produc-
tivity changes  while holding output prices  steady are other strategies for 
increasing total profits).  By  "raising"  selling price we  mean relative to 
what  the price would be  under perfect competition,  not necessarily raising 
price  over  time. 
There  are  no  published studies  that focus  exclusively on  the relationship 
of beef or meat  prices  to meatpacker  concentration.  However,  there are  a  num-
ber of studies  that have  included meatpackers  or  the meatpacking  industry 
among  a  broader  sample  of food processing  companies  and  industries.  Such 
studies were  reviewed  in Connor,  et al.  (1985:Chapter  7).  From  the  estimated 
relationships it is possible to predict whether  supranormal product pricing is 
expected given the  structured configuration of the  industry at hand.  In the 
cases  of beefpacking and meatpacking,  virtually no  monopolistic  overcharge  was 
found  from  a  sample  of 1976  processed food prices.  (Meat  processing,  on  the 
other hand,  had  an expected price elevation due  to market  power  of from  1.0 to 
l.3%) . 
Unfortunately,  these predictions are based on  the  structure of the  meat-
packing  industry as it was  in the mid 1970s,  a  period when  concentration was 
near its lowest  level  in history and entry was  easy.  It is difficult to 
believe that  the higher levels of concentration and barriers  to  entry seen 
today  (levels  considerably higher than the buyer  concentration of meat  dis-
tributors)  would not  cause  some  price elevation.  Similarly,  should fresh beef 
become  as  differentiated as  bacon and sausage  are  today,  one  might  expect 
price elevations  to  consumers  that are  similar to  the meat processing  industry 
in the  1970s  (U.S.  House  of Representatives  1980). -45-
Meatpacker  Margins 
The  margins  generated by meatpackers  are  the  differences between the 
selling prices  of meat  and  the buying prices  (costs)  of inputs purchased  from 
other enterprises.  Purchased  inputs  include cattle,  containers,  energy,  busi-
ness  services,  and machinery  and  equipment.  The  margins  consist of three 
principal components:  returns  to  labor  (wages,  salaries,  and fringe bene-
fits),  returns  to  capital  (dividends  and retained earnings),  and business 
income  taxes.  If input  and product markets  are highly competitive,  then 
employees  earn wages  consistent with their skill levels  (return to human  cap-
ital)  and investors  earn a  long-run return on  investment consistent with busi-
ness  risk in the  industry  (a risk-adjusted normal  rate of return).  If,  on  the 
other hand,  market  power  is being exercised in either the  input markets  (e.g., 
labor unions  or cattle markets)  or product markets,  then wages  or profits may 
be at supracompetitive  levels. 
It is paradoxical  that beefpacker margins  have  fallen during  the  same 
period that their market power  on the buying side  (and probably  the  selling 
side  as  well)  has  increased.  The  explanation for  this apparent  inconsistency 
is  that  some  components  of beefpacker margins  shrank while  one  or more  other 
components  did not. 
As  is  shown  in Table  3,  the  farm-to-carcass  price  spread for beef has 
fallen in real  terms  (fifth column)  and relative  terms  (sixth column)  through-
out  the  1966-1988  period.  Expressed in 1967  dollars,  the  spread fell  from  5.2 
cents  (1966-1970  average)  to  3.3  cents  (1984-1988  average).  Part of the  drop 
is  due  to packer-to-retai1er transportation costs,  but most  of the  spread is 
accounted for by beefpacker costs  of production.  For  example,  wage  rates of 
meatpacking workers  remained nearly flat from  1965  to  1979,  varying  from  $3.25 
to  $3.50 per hour  (1967  dollars);  however,  changes  in labor contracts,  includ-
ing substantial labor union  "give-backs",  led to marked  declines  in real wages 
after 1979,  to  as  low  as  $2.25  per hour  (1967  dollars)  in the  late 1980s. -46-




























I  Deflated 
Marketing  Spreads  I  Farm-to-
I  I  for  Beef  I  Carcass 
Retail  INet  Fa2mIFarm-to3ICarcass-3o-1  Price  4 



























































































































Price  Spread as 
a  Proportion of 


























The  estimated weighted-average  of Bureau of Labor Statistics prices  of 
retail cuts  of beef  from  a  Choice Yield Grade  3  carcass.  Data  for  1989  are 
first quarter only. 
The  feedlot price  including delivery to  the  slaughterhouse or packing plant. 
Average  of eight market prices,  four  terminal markets,  and  four  direct-sales 
arrangements,  collected weekly,  in the  late 1980s.  Price  is net of by-
products  allowances  (retail trim and packer by-products). 
3  Price  is delivered in carcass  form  to  a  Los  Angeles  retailer. 
4  Deflator is the producer price  index  (PP1)  1967=100  for  "crude  consumer 
(finished)  foods"  as  reported in the  Economic  Report  of the  President  (Table 
B-63  in the  1989  report). 
Source:  USDA  (May  1989,  August  1978) . -47-
Combined with  impressive  labor productivity gains  of about  3%  per year,  real 
labor costs per unit of output fell dramatically in meatpacking  (Ward 
1988:139-43).  A  large  source  of the productivity increases  in beefpacking may 
be  ascribed to  the  introduction of boxed beef and associated  large-scal~ 
assembly-line  technologies,  though labor productivity was  increasing fast in 
the  1950s  and  1960s before boxed beef was  a  significant factor.  It is likely' 
that the  smaller meatpacker  spreads yielded higher cattle prices  for producers 
and  lower beef prices  for  consumers  than would have  been the  case had these 
changes  not occurred. 
Note  that the packer price  spreads  shown  in Table  3  are  the  sum  of packer 
margins  and costs of production.  Profit margins  (pre-tax)  of beefpackers  are 
generally less  than  2%  of sales,  which means  that profits  account  for,  at 
most,  one-third of the  farm-to-carcass  spread,  and perhaps  as  little as  3%  in 
some  years.  Thus,  even  a  doubling of profit rates would  increase  the  spread 
only slightly.  The  effects of labor costs,  economies  of scale,  and productiv-
ity changes  on  the  spread very likely overwhelm the  opposing  changes  in the 
spread engendered by rising profits. 
Meatpacker Returns 
After-tax  returns  for meatpackers  average  about  1%  on sales,  but for  com-
parison with other industries  those  returns  should be  related to  stockholders' 
equity  (invested capital) .  From  1974  to  1985,  meatpackers  had returns  averag-
ing  11. 0%  (according to  the American Meat  Institute)  or 14. 4%  (Forbes  magazine 
compilation).  Beefpackers'  profits rates have  been historically 40%  to  50% 
higher  than hogpackers,  so  by projection 1974-85 beefpacker profits  as 
reported to  AMI  averaged about  16.1%.  Beefpackers'  profits are  about  the  same 
as  other  food  processors  in that period,  but are significantly higher  than the 
rest of manufacturing  (Connor  1988) .  In the  1960s  and early 1970s,  meatpacker -48-
profits were  significantly lower  than other  food manufacturers  (U.S.  National 
Commission  on  Food Marketing 1966). 
There  are very  few  studies of the relationship of meatpacker profits or 
margins  to market  structure.  Those  that have been published.suffer  from 
severe  data limitations.  Ward  (1988:l8~-190)  correlated published after-tax 
profit rates  (from AMI  and  Forbe~ magazine  surveys)  with  Census  Bureau .CR4 
data.  Using published 1974-1985 profitability data means  overlooking  some 
privately owned  or nonresponsive  firms;  data on only  12  firms  were  collected. 
Moreover,  as  previously mentioned,  Census  data are  increasingly poor  in their 
coverage  of some  beef fabricating plants.  Finally,  no  control variables were 
included in Ward's  model.  A  second model  estimated by Ward  used  Census  price-
cost .margin,  which are based on fairly  co~plete meatpacking plant data;  how-
ever,  in this case  the  other criticisms  (poor  concentration data,  no  controls) 
remain.  It is quite likely that these  shortcomings  are  responsible  for  the 
failure  to  find any correlation between profits and meatpacker  concentration. 
A study by  Schroeter  (1988)  uses  a  considerably more  sophisticated method 
of analysis  (see  Schmalensee  1988,  Christina-Tsigas  1989).  In this case, 
wholesale  margins  in the beef subsector were  examined over  time  to  see whether 
there was  evidence  of change  in the  exercise of market  power.  The  index of 
market  power  for  the beef industry was  found  to  rise above  competitive  levels, 
especially in the late 1970s,  though  the  index was still below pure  monopoly 
levels  even at the  end of  the period examined. 
Thus,  the  evidence  of market power  on  the  selling side of the beefpackers 
operations  is mixed at best.  Solid evidence  from  the  1970s  points  to  a  con-
tribution of 0.2  to  0.4 percentage points  to  sales margins  from  the buying 
power  of beefpackers.  That  is,  in the late 1970s  the after-tax profits of 
beefpackers  would have been one-quarter to  one-third lower if beefpackers had 
been fully price competitive.  Changes  in market  structure since  then suggest -49-
that the  monopoly  rents  of beefpackers  may  be  a  higher proportion of account-
ing profits  today. 
G.  Competition Policy 
There  are many  ways  for  societies  to assert social control over  domestic 
markets  that are  experiencing  "market failure."  Laissez-faire policies are 
predicated on  the belief that markets  are  reasonably competitive.  If concen-
tration is  low  and market  entry is easy in a  homogeneous  product market,  com-
petition among  sellers produces  socially optimal results  -- maximum  production 
at the  lowest possible price.  Since  1980,  federal antitrust and regulatory 
enforcement has  been minimal  (Connor,  et al.  1985).  Indeed,  a  significant 
degree  of deregulation has  occurred during  the  last decade,  with  a  marked 
slowing  in the  late 1980s.  The  present presidential administration has  given 
few hints  as  to its future  regulatory or antitrust initiatives.  In this  sec-
tion we  explore  the  likely implications  for  the beef industry of alternative 
policy scenarios. 
Continued Laissez-Faire 
In this  scenario,  we  assume  that of the antitrust laws  on  the books,  only 
overt price conspiracies  (cartels)  are strictly enforced.  Laws  covering price 
discrimination  (including predatory pricing),  mergers,  monopolizing markets, 
consumer protection,  and  other restraints  on  trade  are  in abeyance. 
There  is little doubt  that concentration would rise further ,  though not 
as  fast  as  in the last ten years,  fueled primarily by mergers.  If the kinds 
of mergers  in the beef industry in 1987  (or  the  chicken business  in 1989)  ate 
permitted to  continue,  nothing  can stop  a  merger  of the  second- and  third-
ranking  firms;  once  they become  number  1,  the  former  leader will be  free  to 
buy  the  fourth-ranked  company;  and  so  on.  Only  a  relatively small  number  of 
beefpackers will be left to  serve relatively specialized "niche"  markets  too -50-
small  to  interest the  major packers  (kosher,  military,  some  foodservice,  and 
the  like).  The  leading beefpacker(s)  will be  able  to  achieve  rates of return 
on equity as  high as  the highest in the beverage  or  tobacco  industries 
ar ound  25% ,  double  present levels .  To  accomplish this,  packer margins  would 
need to  double,  with beef prices rising  1%  or cattle prices  falling by more 
than  1%  or  some  combination of the  two.  These price changes  would  reduce 
slightly  the  competitiveness  of beef vis-a-vis  other meats  and  in interna-
tional markets. 
Cooperative Organization 
With  a  laissez-faire regulatory climate,  cattle growers  or feedlot  oper-
ators  could  take  advantage of the  Capper-Volstead law that permits  farmers 
cooperatives  to act as bargaining agents  (i.e.,  collude legally on selling 
price)  for cattle producers  in negotiations with meatpackers.  The  law  allows 
cooperatives  to nullify the market  power  of packers  in procurement of cattle. 
It i s  even possible for cattle cooperatives  to enter beefpacking.  Packer mar-
ket power  could still be wielded on  the  selling side,  but only consumers  would 
pay,  not producers.  While  this  scenario represents  a  feasible  option,  the 
independent  character of most cattle producers  makes  them much  less  likely to 
organize  than dairy farmers. 
Rigorous  Enforcement  of Antitrust Laws 
More  assiduous  enforcement of existing antitrust provisions  or clarifica-
t ion of enforcement procedures by  the  Congress  would have  its greatest  impact 
on hal ting proposed future  mergers.  For  example,  the authorities might halt 
horizontal mergers  involving packers  with at least a  5%  market  share.  Similar 
standards  could be  applied to  the buying side as  well  as  the  selling side of 
beefpackers'  operations .  The  present structure would be  frozen,  as histor-
ically the  courts have been reluctant to  dissolve already merged  firms. -51-
In addition to stricter merger  enf.orcement,  Congressional direction is 
needed  in at least three other areas:  private"antitrust suits,  conglomerate 
firm strategies,  and price discrimination.  In the well  known  Illinois Brick 
case,  the  Supreme  Court  decided that" p"arties  indirectly injured by price-fix-
ing conspiracies had no  standing in the  federal courts.  Yet,  a  1989  decision 
by  the  Court has  let stand state laws  that would permit,  for  example,  cattle-
men  to  sue  retailers who  fixed meat prices.  It appears  that the  Court is 
ready  to  accept as  constitutional Congressional efforts  to  give  standing to 
indirectly injured parties in antitrust suits.  Second," clarification is 
needed concerning conglomerate  firms'  conduct.  There  are virtually no 
restraints  on conglomerate  mergers  under present  laws.  The  practice of many 
conglomerates  of using profits  from  one  line of business  (for  example,  petro-
leum or processed meats)  to  subsidize long-term losses  in another line  (for 
example,  below cost pricing to  gain market  share  in beefpacking)  probably is 
legal,  despite  the negative effect it can have  on  industry structures. 
Finally,  Congressional direction is needed  to  develop  standards  for  the  appli-
cation of the  Robinson-Patman Act which prohibits anticompetitive price dis-
crimination.  The  Act has  fallen into virtual disuse at the  federal  level for 
several years. 
The  impacts  of renewed antitrust attention,  particularly at the  federal 
level,  are fairly straightforward.  Smaller  surviving packers  would be  less 
concerned about  the  effects of discriminatory pricing and  other unfair 
tactics.  Major  packers  could  grow  only by building new plants,  cost-cutting, 
expanding exports,  or making  acquisitions  abroad.  Prices  and profits would 
remain at 1980s  averages. 
Increased Market  Regulation 
The  "deregulation"  movement  of the  1980s  appears  to have  run out of 
steam.  There  may  be  greater political will to  impose  constraints  on business -52-
behavior  in areas  like food  safety and quality,  ingredient and nutrition 
labeling,  consumer protection,  expanded use of mandatory business  information 
disclosure,  and  reduced legal protection of trademarks  and  trade  names  (see 
Connor,  et al.  1985:379-391). 
The  effect of  most  of these  initiatives would be  to  make  accurate  infor-
mation more  widely available for  consumers,  stockholders,  and  competing sell-
ers .  Data  on profitability of SEC-regulated packers  and  other  firms  in the 
beef subsector,  by line of business  (beef,  veal,  pork,  etc.)  would provide 
guides  to  investment,  including signals  to new  firms  to  enter high-profit 
lines of business;.  Foreign-owned  and privately owned  firms  above  a  certain 
size  could be  required to file abbreviated public reports  on their financial 
performance.  Renewed  consideration of grades,  standards,  and labeling would 
reduce  the  scope  for product differentiation and attendant nonprice  competi-
tion.  Misleading use  of vague  terms  ("organic,"  "natural,"  and  "light")  cause 
confusion  among  consumers ;  there is  an  implied disparagement of products not 
carrying  such identifiers.  Trade  regulation rules  could be  developed to 
ensure  that the  terms  convey meaningful  quality information to buyers. 
As  major beefpackers  and distributors become  more  conglomerated,  sup-
pliers to  and  customers  of such  firms  suffer information loss .  Product dif-
ferentiation shifts the  focus  of seller rivalry from price competition to  non-
price strategies.  These  conditions  are not yet severe  in the beef subsector, 
but regulatory initiatives along  the  lines  suggested above  would prevent  the 
erection of additional barriers  to  entry and  social waste  in the  form  of 
excessive  brand-oriented selling effort.  These  departures  from  competitive 
market  structures have  been  the  source  of considerable price elevation in the 
other  food  industries . -53-
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